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INTRODUCTION 
What are the signs of healthy behavior in an innovative industry? 
This seemingly simple question isn’t so simple to answer in a 
quickly evolving industry such as the Internet. Commercial behavior 
resides inside a complex value chain, which is a set of interrelated 
activities that produces a final product for end users. No single firm 
controls the value chain, and the quality, price, and user experience arise 
from the complex interactions between those participants. Moreover, 
over time many parts of this value chain have undergone innovative 
improvements, and no reasonable observer expects those improvements 
to cease tomorrow. 
There is no agreement about which criteria observers and policy 
makers should use to assess the performance of the commercial Internet. 
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Ever since the commercial Internet first emerged, there have been 
arguments about how to best organize its value chain to achieve 
maximum value for the most users. Disagreements have not diminished 
with time. If anything, this debate has grown shrill as the number of 
commercial interests and business commentators have grown. 
This essay makes a novel contribution to this topic. It identifies 
patterns of healthy commercial behavior indicative of an innovative 
industry, and illustrates how to observe signs of such behavior in 
information technology markets, such as the Internet. Stated broadly, the 
essay identifies healthy behavior that correlates with desirable market-
wide outcomes, such as improvement in products, lower prices, new 
capabilities, or other innovations that lead to productivity improvements 
among business users. 
This essay highlights four signs of the healthy innovative behavior: 
 
 economic experiments 
 vigorous standards competition 
 entrepreneurial invention 
 the absence of unilateral bargaining 
 
Unlike most prior writing in this area, the essay is not motivated by 
any normative proposal for governing the Internet value chain, such as 
net neutrality or reasonable network management, or any specific 
proposal for legal or regulatory reform. To be sure, the reasoning in the 
essay will have some implications for some aspects of these proposals, but 
that is not its primary purpose. 
This essay is written in the spirit of aspirations to develop a “third 
way” for addressing infrastructure policy issues in the Internet. A third 
way seeks to nurture innovation by avoiding lengthy and protracted 
fights in agency hearings and courtrooms—avoiding events that sustain 
uncertainty about the value of commercial investments, sometimes for 
years at a time. Such sustained uncertainty damages the interests of every 
industry participant in a fast moving market, both users and suppliers. 
A third way would rely on dispute resolution mechanisms that 
operate much faster, such as negotiations and guidelines.
1 This third way 
would employ arbitration and administrative resolution to disputes, 
avoiding the slow tools of regulatory command and control. It would 
avoid, in particular, an extremely damaging event that is all too common 
in regulatory processes for telecommunications in the United States—the 
slow and sometimes discursive processes associated with regulatory ping-
pong between federal agency decisions and court-ordered remedies and 
  1. See Phil Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, & the Hidden Side of the 
Administrative State (Univ. Colo. Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 09-01 2009). 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  27 
appeals.  
I f  s u c h  “ a  t h i r d  w a y ”  e m e r g e s ,  i t  a l s o  w i l l  a s p i r e  t o  r e d u c e  
uncertainty. How does it do that? Such a process aspires to be 
predictable, saving all parties the trouble of adjudication in any but the 
rarest circumstances. To achieve predictability, the administrators will 
publish transparent guidelines for all relevant participants. 
That is where this essay makes a contribution. Guidelines 
necessarily require a conceptual framework and benchmark for 
recognizing innovative behavior. The benchmark must help regulators 
quickly recognize when a market action does or does not contribute to a 
healthy innovative outcome. This essay proposes a framework for 
building such a benchmark. 
At present, the closest any policy statements get to such a 
benchmark in the United States are the four Internet principles issued by 
the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). In their most recent 
restatement by the outgoing chairman of the FCC, Kevin Martin, the 
four principals are:  
Consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their 
choice; Consumers are entitled to run applications and services of 
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; Consumers are 
entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the 
network; Consumers are entitled to competition among network 
providers, application and service providers, and content providers.
2  
These principles are intended to signal the direction of future policy 
without committing the agency to specific actions. As noted by many 
observers, the principles aspire to contain both generality and flexibility 
in the face of inevitable change in the industry.
3 Yet, that also explains 
what I regard as their primary drawback. They are rather open-ended 
and curt in comparison to the efforts of other federal agencies to offer 
policy guidelines. 
In my view, that curtness undermines their ability to reduce 
uncertainty by signalling what a federal regulator regards as healthy and 
unhealthy innovative behavior. They also fail to reduce regulatory delay 
  2.  Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities,  Policy Statement,  20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (2005), available at 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/FCC-05-151A1.pdf/ [hereinafter Policy Statement];  cf. 
Net Neutrality FCC / FTC, C YBERTELECOM,  available at http://www.cybertelecom.org/ 
ci/neutralfcc.htm (past statements by ex-Chairman Michael Powell). 
  3. Footnote 15 of the Policy Statement, supra note 2, states, “Accordingly, we are not 
adopting rules in this policy statement. The principles we adopt are subject to reasonable 
network management,” begging the question, “What is the definition of reasonable network 
management?”  See, e.g., Isen.blog, http://www.isen.com/blog/2005/08/how-martins-fcc-is-
different-from.html (Aug. 7, 2005, 17:07 EST); Net Neutrality FCC / FTC, supra note 2. 28  J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol.  8 
because they are inviting regulatory hearings followed by court 
interpretation, triggering the usual damaging ping-pong.  
One comparison with a standard benchmark of competition policy 
in the United States can illustrate why I perceive the four principles as 
open-ended and curt. In 1968 the Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission first issued a set of very detailed merger guidelines, 
revising them most recently in 1997, and issuing extensive commentary 
on them again in 2006.
4 While the guidelines do not commit the DOJ or 
FTC to specific actions in specific mergers, these have become a 
benchmark for firms and agencies, helping firms anticipate likely DOJ 
and FTC responses to proposed mergers. This makes the process more 
predictable, which helps all parties plan, and it reduces negotiation costs 
for all participants.
5  
By comparison, do the four principles provide a similar level of 
guidance? It is not even close. The four principles cover only a narrow 
range of actions. There have been only a few examples to illustrate how 
the FCC intends to employ these principles, involving Madison River 
and Comcast. There are many plausible circumstances not covered, and 
in which the principles do not help market participants forecast whether 
their own decisions will generate close regulatory scrutiny or not. Such 
open-endedness seems particularly damaging for innovative behavior 
because, said simply, there are few indications about when 
commissioners and staff will view innovative behavior as healthy or not. 
These concerns motivate focusing on identifying the behavioral 
signs of innovative health. I perceive there would be a gain for policy 
from clarifying benchmarks that any observer, even querulous lawyers on 
opposite sides of a policy issue, could use to assess the state of health of 
an innovative market, such as the Internet. 
In Section I, I review the broad motivation behind the essay’s core 
question. Section II provides an analysis of the four signs of innovative 
health. Section III discusses some implications of this approach for 
events involving dominant firms in which the FCC did or did not apply 
the four principles, such as disputes involving Comcast, and another 
between Sprint and Cogent. 
I. THE VALUE CHAIN FOR THE INTERNET 
The complexity and evolution of the Internet’s value chain 
  4.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  ANTITRUST  DIVISION,  MERGER  ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDELINES, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger.htm. 
  5.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FTC,  HORIZONTAL  MERGER  GUIDELINES, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm. See also, DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, 
COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL  MERGER  GUIDELINES, http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2006/03/CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf. 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  29 
motivates the core question behind this essay. It is worthwhile to 
understand this motivation in some depth. The structure of the Internet 
value chain has evolved in a direction that will give rise to numerous 
policy issues into the foreseeable future. 
The value chain for Internet services appears to be perpetually in 
transition. To paraphrase the economist, Bruce Owen, the players have 
only reached the fifth inning of a nine-inning ball game and there is no 
rain delay in sight.
6 That evolution raises a challenge for any regulatory 
framework: it makes it quite difficult to assess the general factors 
encouraging behavior that leads to innovative outcomes. 
Indeed, ever since the Internet commercialized many of its 
participants have maintained a strong sense about their exceptional 
nature, as if innovation within the existing value chain for the Internet 
defied established archetypes of innovation. For example, the Internet 
did not arise as a consequence of one single breakthrough invention from 
one single genius, à la Edison and the light bulb. 
That view raises a rather deep economic question about whether 
innovation within the Internet can be assessed with the same economic 
concepts used elsewhere in innovative markets, such as computing. This 
essay will largely argue that it can be. 
The truth about the early development of the commercial Internet is 
less exciting than this attitude of exceptionalism would suggest. It 
involved a vastly dispersed set of actors. The Internet developed slowly 
and through a rather mundane process, accumulating capabilities over 
t i m e  f r o m  a n  e n o r m o u s  n u m b e r  o f  c o n t r i b u t o r s .  A s  s u c h ,  i t  f i t s  a n  
archetype that scholars of innovation label as “Collective Invention.”
7 For 
example, the creation, refinement, and improvement of e-mail prior to 
1990 involved contributions from more than fifty different people over 
two decades, and that application was one new application among many.
8 
More specifically, the Internet initially accumulated capabilities over 
time in a government project hidden from mainstream view. Technical 
success generated interest and use, spread technology among researchers, 
and gained economic value by growing capabilities in a community that 
did not recognize its economic value for non-researchers.
9 
 6.  Bruce  Owen,  Broadband Mysteries,  in B ROADBAND:  SHOULD  WE  REGULATE 
HIGH-SPEED INTERNET ACCESS? 9–38 (Robert W. Crandall & James H. Alleman eds., 
Am. Enter. Inst. Press 2003). 
  7. See, e.g., Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 1, 1–
24 (1983); Peter B. Meyer, Episodes of Collective Invention (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Working Paper No. 368, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=466880. 
 8.  Craig  Partridge,  The Technical Development of Internet E-mail, 30 IEEE ANNALS OF 
THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING 3-29 (2008). 
  9. See, e.g., JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (MIT Press 2000); Shane 
Greenstein, Wild Ducks and Inconspicuous Accumulation: Innovation in the Government-Sponsored 
Internet (Kellogg Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper, March 2009), available at 30  J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol.  8 
Once commercialized, the Internet began to accumulate more 
capabilities and functions, as a range of firms began to use pieces of the 
Internet to enhance services provided to paying customers. Over time, 
“the Internet” became a label for not only the Internet, but also for all the 
applications that accumulated around the Internet, used pieces of the 
Internet, and commercialized new functions for the Internet, which 
cumulatively delivered an enormous array of services to a wide range of 
users. 
Three factors in particular altered the discussion about the value 
chain in the last decade. First, the predominant access mode for the 
Internet changed. Second, several leading businesses organized several 
different platforms to alter the potential value chains for users and 
developers. Third, the predominant contractual framework for governing 
transactions was never completed. 
Each one of these factors raises further questions about the presence 
of market power and its distortion on innovative outcomes. Each factor 
also raises questions about the ability of a savvy observer to assess the 
innovative health of the Internet. 
I describe each of these factors in turn and explore why they 
motivate the core question of this essay. 
A. Broadband 
In the 1990s the model Internet Service Provider (ISP) was a dial-
up charging $20 a month on average.
10 By the turn of the millennium 
this industry had generated over $10 billion in revenue,
11 which was quite 
impressive for an economic activity so young. At a broad level, however, 
it supported only applications that could tolerate some delay in the 
delivery of data. That restriction on the value of output rendered moot 
many arguments about how to best govern the value chain. Subsequent 
developments brought those arguments to the forefront.
12 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/greenstein/images/research.html. 
  10. Tom Downes & Shane Greenstein, Universal Access and Local Commercial Internet 
Markets, 31 RES.  POLICY 1035–1052 (2002); Tom Downes & Shane Greenstein, 
Understanding why Universal Service Obligations May be Unnecessary: The Private Development 
of Local Internet Access Markets, 62 J.  URBAN  ECON. 2–26 (2007); Shane Greenstein, 
Innovation and the Evolution of Market Structure for Internet Access in the United States, in THE 
INTERNET AND AMERICAN BUSINESS 47 (William Aspray & Paul E. Ceruzzi eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter Evolution of Market Structure for Internet Access]; Shane Greenstein, Building and 
Developing the Virtual World: The Commercial Internet Access Market, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 4 
(2000). 
  11. Shane Greenstein & Ryan McDevitt, The Broadband Bonus: Accounting for Broadband 
Internet’s Impact on U.S. GDP. (NBER, Working Paper No. 14758, 2009), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14758. 
  12. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: 
AMERICAN  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  POLICY IN THE INTERNET  AGE (2005); see also, 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  31 
The predominant mode of access changed in a short period. In 
September 2001, approximately 45 million U.S. households accessed the 
Internet through a dial-up connection, whereas only 10 million used a 
broadband connection.
13 By March 2006, a sharply contrasting picture 
emerged: approximately 47 million households (and growing) had 
broadband connections, whereas 34 million (and declining) used dial-
up.
14 According to the latest survey of the Pew Internet and American 
Life Project, in April, 2009, less than 10% of U.S. households had dial-
up Internet connections, and 63% of U.S. households had broadband.
15 
Consistent with the increasing adoption of broadband by 
households and its higher monthly prices on average, the total revenue in 
access markets grew. So, too, did the fraction of revenue going to 
broadband.
16 
Simple economic factors determined the growing trend to 
broadband internet serve. Dial-up became available first and diffused to 
more than half of U.S. households. Thereafter broadband emerged as a 
higher quality and more expensive alternative, albeit one available in only 
a few places and from a limited set of providers, if any. Over time, 
however, broadband became more reliable and more widely available, 
which enabled many households to upgrade their Internet service. 
Today, most urban households face a duopoly of wire-line choice: 
(1) an offering from a local cable franchise, and (2) an offering from a 
local telephone company. In some locations, they also may face options 
for wireless providers, which potentially may convert the duopoly into a 
more competitive supply. In many suburban areas (less dense settings) 
households face that duopoly or only one wire-line provider. To the 
contrary, one wire-line provider services households in many rural 
settings or isolated small cities, where households lack alternatives to 
Evolution of Market Structure for Internet Access, supra note 10, at 47–104 (Those arguments had 
antecedents in the open access movement, but became reformulated as broadband diffused. 
They were reformulated principally in the form of the “net neutrality” movement. As noted 
earlier, the FCC policy’s ambiguity about the meaning of ‘reasonable network management’ 
left open many issues.); see e.g., George Ou, A Policy Maker’s Guide to Network Management, 
THE  INFO.  TECH. AND INNOVATION  FOUND. (2008) (a review and analysis of various 
definitions and their implications), available at 
http://www.itif.org/files/Network_Management.pdf. 
  13.  NATIONAL  TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION  ADMINISTRATION 
(NTIA),  A  NATION  ONLINE:  ENTERING THE BROADBAND  AGE (2004), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports.html. 
 14.  John  Horrigan,  Home Broadband Adoption, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 
(2007)  available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2007/Home-Broadband-Adoption-
2007/ Data-Memo/Findings.aspx?r=1. 
 15.  John  Horrigan,  Home Broadband Adoption, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 
(2009)  available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/10-Home-Broadband-
Adoption-2009.aspx?r=1. 
  16.  Greenstein & McDevitt, supra note 11. 32  J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol.  8 
dial-up internet service except through a satellite provider and/or other 
wireless ISP. 
As a cause for both celebration and concern, broadband firms 
inhabit a position of monopoly or duopoly in a key part of the value 
chain. On the one hand, broadband’s position reflects the ascendency of 
a superior product and service in replacing dial-up, an economic 
improvement over the near past. On the other hand, it raises concerns 
about the presence of market power and the incentives to make future 
improvements. 
At a broad level, most texts in standard industrial economics stress 
the issues with this situation.
17 While society benefits from giving 
incentives to firms to create superior products and services, rewarding 
firms with monopoly power comes at a cost to society, presuming firms 
with high market share possess market power. Such firms may face 
weaker incentives to innovate than firms in any more competitive market 
structure.
18 Net neutrality advocates also have expressed a related concern 
that the retail market power will be used to shape the incentives of others 
in the value chain in adverse ways.
19 
Broadband’s ascendency into the majority of households gave rise to 
another issue because it enabled a range of applications to blossom. 
Generally speaking, four types of rather different uses share the same 
capacity: (1) browsing and e-mail, which tend to employ low bandwidth 
and tolerate delay; (2) video downloading, which can employ high 
bandwidth and can tolerate some delay; (3) voice-over IP and video-talk, 
which tend to employ high bandwidth and whose quality declines with 
delay; and (4) peer-to-peer applications, which tend to use high 
bandwidth for sustained periods of time, and can tolerate delay, but, in 
some applications (e.g., Bit-Torrent) can impose delay on others.
20 
That range of uses and applications today also raises cheers and 
concerns. The Internet has evolved from a mere e-mail network for 
technically skilled users during its first decade into an e-mail or instant 
  17. See K IP  VISCUSI,  JOSEPH  HARRINGTON  &  JOHN  VERNON, ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 4 (2005); see also DENNIS CARTON & JEFFREY PERLOFF, 
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2004). 
  18. See Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where are we in the Competition-
Innovation Debate, 6 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 159–215 (2006); see also, Jonathan Baker, 
Beyond Schumpeter versus Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 
575–602 (2007). While this broad point is generally accepted, there is considerable debate 
surrounding many aspects related to its general applicability and about what policy can/should 
do to foster competitive incentives aimed at raising innovation incentives. 
  19. See e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBER SPACE (1999); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, VERSION 2.0 (2006); Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Keeping the 
Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 581 (2007); 
Ou, supra note 12. 
  20. See  Ou, supra note 12. 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  33 
messaging communications network for some, a gaming network for 
others, a source of news for others, and a distribution channel for video 
and musical entertainment for others. For others still, it is the principal 
media for engaging with geographically dispersed communities of 
friends. 
While that diversity of applications wrings additional productivity 
out of the same capital supporting the network, it comes with a potential 
drawback: the use of one application affects the productivity of another. 
In part this is due to capacity constraints at bottleneck positions in the 
network; there are few backbone pathways to support browsing in 
isolated positions. Contributing to these constraints are geographically 
localized negative externalities (e.g., many modern peer-to-peer 
applications employ all available bandwidth, diminishing the quality of 
other applications in the same cable network that cannot tolerate delay). 
The market for Internet access could become more complex over 
time. Options vary in speed, quality, and price. There have been data 
services from the major cellular carriers (e.g., Verizon, AT&T, and 
others) for several years, particularly for e-mail delivery to laptops. The 
most popular mechanism in the recent past was a simple device for 
delivery of e-mail (e.g., a BlackBerry). More complex devices have gained 
popularity (e.g., iPhones and smart phones), and these have download 
speeds that begin to approach the low end of wire-line broadband speeds. 
Technological optimists forecast even faster download speeds from 
next generation wireless carriers (e.g., WiMax or LTE). There is still 
considerable uncertainty about how many of these services the market 
will support, about what price and sales levels will prevail, and, 
accordingly, what scale of deployment these prices and sales levels will 
support. 
The pace and level of change suggest that the provision of Internet 
access has not stopped evolving, nor will they soon. In the best of all 
worlds the prior gains are permanent and the most worrisome concerns 
are temporary.  
Why does this evolution pose a quandary for a regulator? It is not 
worrisome if the multiplicity of access choices erodes market power of 
any individual actor. It is worrisome if some actors retain market power, 
and use it to discourage innovations that do not serve their interests. The 
questions are central to any innovation policy for the Internet. What 
relevance will market power have to innovation policy in the Internet? 
Does limiting the distortions of market power provide justification for 
government intervention? If so, what type of action, and what are its 
limitations? 
More to the point, in a setting where market power might or might 
not be present, and might or might not be employed for purposes that 34  J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol.  8 
run afoul of policy sensibility, private actors gain little insight into the 
thinking of public policy makers who publically commit to only four 
sentences. Surely private firms benefit from knowing how to anticipate 
the norms and standards employed by regulators to recognize the signs of 
healthy and unhealthy behavior in a situation that is changing so much. 
B. Platforms 
Well-designed standards and platforms hold one of the keys to the 
successful accumulation of functionality over time. Consider this brief 
overview about how platforms have changed over time, and how those 
changes altered the ability of a savvy observer to assess the innovative 
health of the Internet. 
By way of background, typical use of Internet-related services 
requires successful execution of a set of technically interrelated activities 
coming from many independent firms. The failure or reduction in 
performance of any of these activities can lead to inferior outcomes for 
many users. Focusing solely on such technical action, however, misses a 
key dimension of how firms address the challenges. Even the simplest of 
activities in this value chain, such as sending e-mail, involves many 
participants, and efficient delivery of services depends on advanced 
agreement about how their business activities will interrelate. To reduce 
the uncertainty about how such services interoperate, commercial firms 
take one of two approaches: either they negotiate arrangements in 
advance with all relevant participants, or, if that fails, they do it all 
themselves. 
In the parlance of business language, firms either negotiate 
standards with others so the task performs smoothly, or they offer a 
platform that accomplishes the task. Platforms are a standard bundle of 
components and designs around which vendors build services. Platform 
strategies played an important role in computing before the 
commercialization of the Internet.
21 Many firms naturally organized their 
strategic approach for commercial opportunities on the Internet with 
similar approaches. 
  21. See e.g., Timothy Bresnahan & Shane Greenstein, Technical Progress and Co-Invention 
in Computing and In the Use of Computers, BROOKINGS  PAPERS ON ECON.  ACTIVITY: 
MICROECONOMICS 1–78 (1997); Timothy Bresnahan & Shane Greenstein, Technological 
Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry, J. INDUS. ECON. 1–40 (1999); see also, 
ANNABELLE  GAWER  &  M.A.  CUSUMANO, PLATFORM  LEADERSHIP:  HOW  INTEL, 
MICROSOFT AND CICSO DRIVE INDUSTRY INNOVATION (2002); Annabelle Gawer & R. 
Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from 
Intel, 16 J.ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 1–34 (2007); DAVID EVANS, ANDREI HAGIU, & 
RICHARD  SCHMALENSEE,  INVISIBLE  ENGINES:  HOW  SOFTWARE  PLATFORMS  DRIVE 
INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES (2007); ANNABELLE GAWER, PLATFORMS, 
MARKETS AND INNOVATION (Edward Elgar ed., forthcoming Dec. 2009). 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  35 
Ever since the emergence of the Internet, several leading businesses 
organized different platforms to alter the potential value chains for users 
and developers. There are proprietary platforms, open source platforms, 
and business platforms, all of which interoperate to provide services and 
some of which compete at the same time. 
As with the rise of broadband, the rise of platforms on the Internet 
is a source of both celebration and consternation. While platforms 
perform functions that firms and/or users value, their presence usually 
suggests that some firms/users are better off with them than without. At 
the same time, large or dominant platform leaders (usually) possess 
market power, thereby raising questions about whether those firms use 
their discretion in ways that lead to more innovation. 
The list of important platforms today is long. To illustrate this 
observation, I highlight two proprietary platform providers, Microsoft 
and Intel, and one non-proprietary platform, open source communities. 
Perhaps the best known of the commercial platform providers is 
Microsoft, which develops and sells an operating system branded as 
Windows. It organizes the computing platform around the personal 
computer, as well as many Intel-based servers. To produce and deliver 
this product Microsoft engages with a multiplicity of actors, users (e.g., 
businesses and households), original equipment manufacturers (OEMs, 
e.g., Dell, HP, and others), and application developers (e.g., software 
vendors). The operating system allows all of them to interact with one 
another for more efficient delivery of services. 
Microsoft’s platform strategy for the Internet over the last decade 
has been shaped by its lucrative position selling Windows for PCs and 
for server functions. This has led the firm to offer a mix of supporting 
functionality for the Internet. For example, in the early 1990s it offered 
TCP/IP compatibility in Windows as means to enhance the features of 
its networking software. In the mid 1990s it offered a browser, partly as a 
gateway towards developing a broader array of Web services, and partly 
for defensive purposes, because it matched browsers offered by others, 
notably Netscape at that time. Microsoft eventually won a rather 
confrontational war with Netscape for market share, and continues to 
hold a leading position in browser usage. 
Microsoft has not, however, had as much success in other aspects of 
its commercial Internet ventures. Despite considerable resource 
commitments, its MSN division has never yielded enviable success. Its 
attempt to build an advertising-supported set of applications—including 
a recent attempt to buy Yahoo!
22—also has not yielded big advances. 
  22. Peter Henserson & Braden Reddall, TIMELINE: Microsoft Attempt to Buy Yahoo!, 
REUTERS, May 4, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/ 
idUSGOR47298420080504. 36  J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol.  8 
Despite a leading position in enterprise computing, it has not yet found a 
successful transition to cloud computing applications, such as 
experienced by salesforce.com, for example. Only its investments in Xbox 
now generate revenues in excess of operating costs,
23 as well as a 
significant amount of Internet gaming traffic, but it will be considerable 
time before it generates enough profit to recoup the billions of dollars in 
losses spent developing the platform in the first place, if ever. 
Intel is another prominent platform provider whose strategy arose 
from its lucrative position in PC markets. Intel’s historical platform 
strategy had some similarities to Microsoft’s. It too stands at the middle 
of a large ecosystem, interacting with a range of firms, providing 
leadership that drives towards the standard hardware design and 
specification used in most desk top computers, lap tops, and net books. 
Its behavior also differs from Microsoft’s for a simple reason; Intel 
interacts much more with hardware than software firms. While Intel 
offered the most widely used microprocessor for personal computers, it 
feared losing leadership in new and growing markets for integrated 
circuits, especially processors. It developed a faster microprocessor and 
invested heavily in creating demand for platforms that used it. The latter 
motivated Intel to invest in a wide range of activities, some of them far 
afield from microprocessor manufacturing. 
For example, Intel designed an input-output bus for PCs, even 
though, until that point, it had never been in that business. Intel also 
designed PC motherboards and virtually gave away the design to others, 
as a way to foster improvements that aided its microprocessors.
24 Intel 
helped design and sponsor USB and corresponding USB standards, 
including funding the testing for conformance.
25 It also branched into 
sponsoring a Wi-Fi standard for laptops under the Centrino label, 
helping to design further upgrades to the underlying technical standard, 
which was designed by IEEE committee 802.11, and helping to fund 
conformance-testing organizations as well.
26 More recently, it has 
invested heavily in designing and supporting another 802 wireless 
standard, known as Wi-Max. In addition, Intel has worked hard to 
develop a position as a microprocessor provider for standard designs of 
 23.  Erick  Schonfeld,  Microsoft Lost Nearly $500 Million on the Web Last Quarter, 
TECHCRUNCH, January 22, 2009, available at http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/01/22/ 
microsoft-lost-nearly-500-million-on-the-web-last-quarter/. 
 24.  GAWER & CUSUMANO, supra note 21.  
  25. Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Janet S. Netz, Manipulating Interface Standards as an 
Anticompetitive Strategy,  in S TANDARDS AND PUBLIC  POLICY 231 (Shane Greenstein & 
Victor Stango eds., 2007); Intel.com, Intel Helped Make It Easier to Connect Devices to PCs, 
http://www.intel.com/standards/case/case_usb.htm. 
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smart phone devices. 
Another organizational form for developing an interrelated platform 
of services involves the use of open source institutions, that is, employing 
some variation on the General Public License (GPL) for code or a 
Creative Commons license for copyrighted material. While intellectual 
property often receives the most attention, it is not the key factor for 
most commercial firms. Open source differs sharply from platforms 
organized by Microsoft or Intel in the responsibility and activities of 
management by raising transparency for developers about the features of 
the code and its evolution. In some organizations, open source has an 
additional function: it substitutes participatory/collective decision making 
for unilateral decision making at a single firm. 
In some respects, the open source movement is not new at all as an 
institution for platform development and support. Transparency and 
wide participation have played a role in the development of key protocols 
and standards for the Internet, known as TCP/IP, which are employed 
by most Internet users. These are maintained by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), who maintains a set of fully 
documented and accessible processes for making documented code 
available. It invites wide participation in the design of new protocols and 
standards. It was not called “open source” when it started, but the 
processes strongly resemble the modern transparent processes with wide 
participation (more below).
27 
Another important platform emerges from the Web standards 
maintained by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). It, too, has a 
transparent process, but it employs a different model for decision making 
and participation. The W3C requires firms to pay for their membership, 
and Tim Berners-Lee and his staff retain some authority to make 
decisions unilaterally after consultations with the membership. 
A better known example of these open source platforms is Linux. 
The changes to this open source project hint at how commercialization 
and open source have both recently changed. Linux began as a volunteer 
project by Linus Torvalds, but today has firm support for a consortium 
operated by Torvalds. This consortium supports a range of businesses 
operated by many firms, including IBM, Red Hat, and others. 
More broadly, open source platforms now appear in many 
commercial ventures on the Internet. A range of other business models 
have emerged for platform development around open source, including 
businesses organized by MySQL (for databases) and Mozilla and Webkit 
(for the Firebox, Safari, and Chrome browsers). The same could be said 
  27. Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force,  in O PEN  SOURCES:  VOICES 
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for a range of Web 2.0 efforts, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr, 
which do not use the GPL but instead employ licenses designed by the 
Creative Commons. 
Taking a “snapshot” of the structure today, we can see the 
infrastructure supports a rather complex value chain involving the 
interoperability of many different commercial platforms. This is an 
enormous evolution: the present arrangement looks nothing like the 
Internet of the early 1990s, when it first commercialized. 
Today many observers believe Google has the most effective 
platform on the Internet.
28 Its search engine is the most popular in 
English,
29 as well as in many other languages. That supports a very 
lucrative ad-placement business. Many other firms also expend 
considerable resources optimizing their web pages to appear high on 
Google’s search results, so, like any important platform, Google’s actions 
have become central to the economic prosperity of others.
30 Some 
observers believe this will only continue, as its popularity will allow 
Google to develop a range of products supporting its search business. 
Other prominent platforms include those provided by Cisco 
(networking equipment), Research In Motion (BlackBerry), Apple 
(iPhone, iPod), Yahoo! (search, news, mail), Oracle (enterprise 
databases), E-Bay (auctions), as well as many others. These examples are 
only a few among many prominent commercial platforms shaping 
development of the Internet. It is necessarily a short list and may not 
have the relevant platforms for policy in the near future. Each one of 
these platforms deserves a longer description, and the reader should be 
clear that the absence of that here is due to space constraints, not their 
lack of importance. 
Platforms add an additional layer of decision making to the 
provision of services. That comes with a benefit, to be sure. It lowers 
coordination costs, and it can smooth transactions between participants 
with long term relationships. But platforms also come with some strings 
attached. Once they exist the firms with commercial interests in their 
continuance will take action to make sure they do not easily go away. 
Growth tends to agglomerate the successful platforms, but they also 
 28.  RANDALL STROSS, PLANET GOOGLE: ONE COMPANY’S AUDACIOUS PLAN TO 
ORGANIZE EVERYTHING WE  KNOW (2008); Sarah Lacy, The New Bulls-Eye on Google, 
TECHCRUNCH, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/02/18/the-new-bulls-eye-
on-google/. 
 29.  Erick  Schonfeld,  March ComScore Search Numbers Offer a Sign of Hope for Google, 
TECHCRUNCH, Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/04/14/march-comscore-
search-numbers-offer-a-sign-of-hope-for-google/ (reporting that the 2009 estimates from 
ComScore place Google at 63.7% of all searches done in the U.S., which is over 9 billion 
searches). 
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stand in the way of complementary entry which holds the potential to 
oppose the commercial interests of the present platform leaders. 
Aphoristically, the Internet has been called a “network of networks” 
since it first began to diffuse to the general public. Yet, distilling the 
Internet to that aphorism is misleading; it does not reflect how 
commercial behavior shaped the evolution of technology in the last 
decade and a half. Leading firms and their business partners view the 
commercial Internet through the same lens they view activities in the rest 
of computing. For them, the commercial Internet is a “network of 
platforms.” 
In sum, firms do not make investment decisions aimed in general 
directions. Rather, they make investments aimed at advancing their own 
platform strategies. Firms do not merely defend themselves against entry 
by a new competitor. They develop sophisticated approaches to find out 
which other platforms may pose a threat to their existing profitable 
businesses. Platforms are a central strategic determinant of the direction 
a firm takes.  
Which of these behaviors will not raise alarms and which will? This 
ongoing evolution of platforms poses a thorny question to regulators: 
how can they recognize signs of healthy and unhealthy platform behavior 
in an innovative industry when platforms play such an important role? 
Once again, the questions are central to any innovation policy for the 
Internet. Once again, surely private firms benefit from knowing how to 
anticipate the norms and standards employed to recognize the signs of 
healthy and unhealthy behavior in markets where most dominant firms 
employ platform strategies. 
C. Contractual  Incompleteness 
Contractual incompleteness has become a central feature of the 
Internet value chain. Incompleteness refers to the absence of contracts 
governing regular transactions or, if such contracts exist, to contracts that 
lack fully specified terms for all contingencies. The maturation of the 
Internet value chain has not yet diminished this incompleteness much, 
and there are no signs of change. 
To many economists, such an observation is only a philosophical 
statement. In this essay it is also an observation with pragmatic relevance 
to innovation policy. It provides both justification for government 
intervention, as well as a limitation to it. This justification is quite 
distinct from the two already discussed, both of which stress the role of 
market power. 
Contractual incompleteness arises for many reasons. The Internet 
involves an extraordinarily large number of parties, which renders multi-
lateral negotiations impractical. There are so many players, in part, 40  J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol.  8 
because the value chain supports an extraordinarily multi-purpose 
network, as earlier noted. Said simply, today many parties take action 
and their actions influence one another. There is just no practical way to 
get all these participants—or even their representatives—in the same 
room at the same time to work out a deal by horse-trading one set of 
economic concerns for another. 
For example, even if one set of Skype users might be willing to pay 
another set of Bit-Torrent users to change their behavior, there is no 
practical way to get them all in the same room at the same time to 
negotiate and sign that deal. That incompleteness might further motivate 
another market participant, for example, an ISP, to take further action, 
though I will defer that discussion until later. 
Incompleteness also arises where all parties may recognize the 
potential for technical change to generate new applications that alter 
circumstances, requiring renegotiation of prior contracts whose terms are 
no longer relevant. Yet, many pairs of parties in this setting may fail to 
come to agreement for numerous reasons. Even if the recognition exists, 
the parties may fail to negotiate a solution due to a lack of the type of 
trust and mutual assumptions that usually support renegotiating 
commercial transactions in the face of such contractual incompleteness. 
Most interesting, contractual incompleteness inhibits negotiations, 
as it may be impossible to consummate a deal. The relevant party may 
not even exist yet (if they will be entrepreneurial start-ups) and, thus, 
lack representation in even a basic form, such as a trade-group or related 
commercial organization.
31  
Legal ambiguities for innovative activities also can play a role. 
While contractual obligations govern some of the routine activities, it 
may be more difficult to erect similar obligations for new activities. For 
example, contracts govern the handoff of data from one backbone carrier 
to another, or from one Web application to an edge-caching site, such as 
Akamai’s, or to a content-delivery network, such as Amazon’s. In 
contrast, a looser contractual foundation governs another set of 
interrelated activities. For instance, when an advertising-sponsored Web 
application sends data to a user, the ISP delivers it without alteration, 
because participants await legal rulings. YouTube was founded in an era 
when there were multiple plausible definitions for a precise, legal, and 
safe harbor for copyrighted material for user-supplied video. These 
definitions still remain ambiguous, though court cases continue to refine 
them into a tighter domain. 
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Between contractual incompleteness and legal ambiguities, an 
efficient bargaining solution—a so-called Coasian bargaining solution—
fails to arise. Indeed, such failure is endemic to the setting. The very 
thing that makes the Internet economically successful—the accumulation 
of innovation that supports a wide set of applications for many 
participants, including entrepreneurs—gives rise to conditions that make 
it harder for Coasian solutions to arise. 
The lack of a Coasian bargaining solution can provide an economic 
justification for a potential role for government regulators in specific 
circumstances: to settle disputes when many participants have a stake in 
the solution but private parties fail to account for these externalities; or, 
related, to define “default” terms of commercial relationships that many 
partake in, when the default remains undefined; or, related, to mandate 
terms of standards employed by participants in the value chain when they 
otherwise cannot or do not come to such standards on their own. 
Note, however, this argument implies a limitation on that role. It 
covers only those activities that firms could not already settle themselves 
through contracting, those without externalities, or those which 
necessarily involve unanticipated circumstances. To be sure, however, 
that is not necessarily a substantial limitation if it involves participants 
who are not even in a market yet, such as entrepreneurs. 
Once again, another limitation on decision making also is implied. 
The arguments for intervention presume the existence of a well-
developed set of insights about how to recognize a problem in the 
Internet value chain.
32 As it turns out, some arguments against 
intervening also presume a problem can be recognized.
33 That too 
motivates looking more closely at how such recognition takes place. 
In short, the evolution of the Internet value chain gives rise to many 
of the conditions that stand in the way of a Coasian agreement. That also 
implies that the evolution necessarily stands in the way of making an 
assessment about whether the situation merits intervention or not. Once 
again, the questions are central to any innovation policy for the Internet. 
Once again, private firms benefit from knowing how to anticipate the 
norms and standards employed to recognize failure of a Coasian solution, 
i.e., the signs of healthy and unhealthy behavior in an innovative industry 
such as this. 
II. COMMERCIAL BEHAVIOR AND THE INTERNET 
Four signs of innovative behavior are examined here: economic 
  32. See LESSIG, supra note 19; Wu & Yoo, supra note 19; Ou, supra note 12. 
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experiments, standards competition, entrepreneurial invention, and the 
absence of one-sided bargaining. All four play a role in the accumulation 
of new functionality in services on the Internet, and all four could 
continue to play a role in the future if the structure enables them to. 
A. Economic  Experiments 
An economic experiment is a market-oriented action designed to 
help a firm learn or resolve uncertainty about an unknown economic 
factor. Usually such lessons cannot be learned in a laboratory or 
controlled environment, either because they involve learning about the 
nuances of market demand or learning about sets of procedures for 
providing new services at a lower cost.
34 
Economic experiments vary in purpose. Some experiments focus on 
learning about the profitability of incremental changes in business 
processes, whereas others seek to learn about the restructuring of 
organizations and the profitability that may result from the simultaneous 
alteration of many processes or about the profitability of restructuring the 
relationship among many organizations within an industry. 
Internet markets have been full of economic experiments in the last 
fifteen years. That was especially so in the latter part of the 1990s, when 
firms took a wide variety of bets to learn about unknown aspects of 
customer demand and the costs for meeting them using Web 
technologies. These experiments covered all parts of the value chain for 
delivering services—Internet access, client-server platforms, contracting 
among business partners, and so on. Carriers conducted them and so did 
content providers.
35 
To be sure, not all experiments work out. Indeed, if the learning 
occurs as part of a risky business venture, many of them should not. And, 
accordingly, history is littered with illustrations. In Internet application 
markets some of these firms survived (e.g., Google, Amazon, E-Bay), 
and some of these did not (e.g., WebVan, Pets.com). So it goes. 
Against that backdrop it is pleasing to see that recent behavior looks 
similar. Some firms involved in the Web 2.0 movement (Facebook, 
Friendster, Digg, and others) and this decade’s frontier businesses 
(Salesforce.com and YouTube, for example) will make it, while others 
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won’t. For example, most VCs today are convinced that there will be 
little further entry of new businesses into Web 2.0 and the future will 
involve exit of many of the entrants of the last few years. So it goes again. 
As long as many firms are trying to learn, then the industry looks healthy 
in this respect. 
While some experiments do not succeed, many do. A successful 
business continues to operate and brings new goods and services to users. 
Indeed, while many can recall the failures of the dot-com boom, it 
should be pointed out that success rates for new firms during this era 
were comparatively high, leaving a long string of very valuable activities 
in place.
36 In addition, many of the lessons learned endure, handed out as 
free advice from one manager to the next, benefiting a new generation of 
businesses. 
Note how this assessment differs from the common approach and 
orientation of Wall Street analysts.
37 By definition, economic 
experiments are risky learning exercises, designed to teach a firm (or set 
of firms or set of VCs) about something unknown but relevant to the 
value chain for delivering services. It is not unusual to observe a little 
messiness, and there is no particular reason to anticipate the learning to 
yield immediate profitability. In fact, the learning is usually expensive 
and the benefits come later, so immediate profitability is rare. 
Wall Street’s short run values typically do not reward 
experimentation, regardless of the potential long term gains from such 
lessons. Consider FiOS, Verizon’s program to bring fiber to residences. 
Many technologists think Verizon is late to the party and many stock 
analysts remain skeptical about the potential for large financial returns 
from FiOS.
38 Many analysts also remain skeptical about whether FiOS 
will generate steady returns, much like a utility’s revenue.
39 
Using this emphasis on economic experiments, however, one might 
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say, “Good for Verizon.” That is precisely the type of disagreement that 
should arise if a firm’s management undertakes a risky economic 
experiment. Profitable today or not, pushing the envelope will teach 
Verizon’s management, as well as competitors like AT&T, quite a lot, 
and maybe that will help it lower costs or develop better targeted 
marketing next year. 
Economic experiments also depart from another Wall Street bias for 
assessing the progress of innovation in terms of one firm’s profitability. 
For purposes of public policy, it is often a poor idea to focus on one 
firm’s success or failure to assess the benefits of learning. It is often more 
sensible to take a view of economic experiments taking place in an entire 
market, focusing instead on whether a community of suppliers or users 
are benefiting in the long run. 
For example, this was the most insightful way to understand the 
earliest commercial experience with Wi-Fi, or IEEE standard 802.11b, 
between 1999 and 2001. During this early period of diffusion, many 
firms and users learned about the value of the short-range data 
transmission. The technology was defined, but the business case was not. 
Examining any single firm’s experience would have yielded a rather 
pessimistic assessment, which was a distinctly uninformative way to 
understand what was happening. 
While homes and enterprises explored the gains from installing 
wireless routers, so, too, did a completely unanticipated set of actors: 
coffee shops, cafés, and other hot spots. At the time all actors were trying 
to learn about which implementations created value and which did not. 
Lessons were shared in many public forums. It was a collective economic 
experiment, and it was generally beneficial for many users, though it was 
hard to identify any particular firm for whom it was super.
40 
What is an example of unhealthy experimentation? Here’s one: 
Microsoft’s lack of new releases for Internet Explorer 6.0 at the start of 
this decade. Microsoft deployed little new for five years, spending most 
of its energy and time responding to every new call for security patches, 
as well as dealing with the publicity nightmare that came with having its 
product panned so widely by so many technical experts.
41 After spending 
so much money to win the dominant position on browsers from 
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Netscape, this outcome was unnecessary, as there was no lack of 
capability or resources. It came from a company famous for its 
disciplined approach to a “three-version strategy,” which deliberately 
takes a loss on an early version of a product in order to learn from 
economic experiments. It was as if all such capabilities were forgotten. 
The Internet Explorer example illustrates the potential costs and 
benefits from having only one party conduct experiments. As to the 
costs, if that party has reasons not to conduct experiments, then it leaves 
users and third-party programmers with no alternatives. If new ideas 
have no channel into that one party, then all its partners and users lose 
from the foregone opportunity. Indeed, according to one observer, in 
Microsoft’s case, this outcome partly resulted from the absence of market 
discipline after the collapse of the coalition built around Netscape, which 
permitted an especially bitter internal struggle for strategic direction for 
Internet services to permeate Microsoft’s decisions, to the detriment of 
other firm goals, such as product development.
42 As to the benefits, only 
the appearance of Firefox a few years ago seemed to rouse Microsoft’s 
managers and programmers from their internal squabbles to focus on 
making progress users could measure. I am pleased these days to see 
more activity, reversing past trends. There appear to be more new 
experiments coming out of the WebKit community (e.g., Safari, 
Chrome), as well as from Opera and others. Accordingly, some of the 
good ideas from these new initiatives have found their ways into the 
design of later releases of Internet Explorer. 
The orientation of communications policy towards protecting or 
nurturing economic experiments has varied over time for two principle 
reasons. First, and broadly stated, advocates for policies to nurture 
experimentation generally bear a high burden of proof in public 
discourse, as they must argue about a future that has not yet occurred. 
They must argue that change in a policy will give rise to experimental 
behavior that has not yet arisen (or will diminish), while their opponents 
argue that such experimental behavior has no connection to policy. 
For example, the recent debates about the need for a “Carterfone”  
policy in wireless technology divide precisely on these lines. One side 
argues that a change in policy will bring about more experimentation and 
the other argues that present policy encourages experimentation that 
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would diminish if the policy changed.
43 Both points are logical, but 
cannot be proven without trying one policy that precludes the other. 
Second, while some policies nurture the blossoming of economic 
experiments, that role may be unapparent until after the experiments 
blossom.
44 Such themes run throughout review of FCC intervention in 
the Internet’s growth, for example. Many nurturing policies, such as 
policies for third party access providers, became established for reasons 
connected to historical events unrelated to the Internet.
45 Some, such as 
the policies that resulted from the Computer Inquiries, were in place for 
reasons connected to their role encouraging new entry in information 
technology equipment markets, but nobody had the Internet specifically 
in mind, and had they done so, policy makers may have made different 
choices.
46 In either case, such unintended consequences from prior 
policies make it difficult to give forward-looking advice. 
I want to acknowledge these difficulties, and then restate the reason 
it is essential to nurture economic experiments in spite of the challenges. 
Said succinctly, nobody wants to see some of the Internet’s biggest firms 
turn into Microsoft’s browser division, sitting on its laurels with a buggy 
piece of software, slowly making upgrades, lacking any competitor to 
push it outward, and fighting an internal corporate fight at its own 
leisure, to the exclusion of other concerns. Experiments are a sign of 
progress; lack of them is a sign of stagnation. 
B.  Vigorous Standards Competition 
Bleeding-edge technologies often cannot deploy on a wide scale 
without some routines or processes, and/or coordination of activities 
across many firms. Thus, the ratification of new standards generally acts 
as a leading indicator of impending technological progress and serves as 
another sign of a healthy innovative industry. While new standards and 
upgrades to existing standards may not arrive at a regular rate, a slow 
pace for development or a slow arrival of new standards should set off 
alarms.
47 
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M. Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001). 
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To be sure, this benchmark is particularly challenging to put into 
practice, because some standards are more important than others. The 
protocols known as TCP/IP have played a central role for decades, for 
example, and any alteration to them receives considerable attention, 
deservedly more attention than other standards. The same is so for 
protocols which govern the Web, as well as those standards that govern 
upgrades to Ethernet. 
Those examples are a bit misleading, however, as they give a false 
sense of certainty to the enterprise of designing standards. As it turns 
out, there are often multiple solutions to the same problem. That may be 
due to differences of opinion about what the true problem is, or about 
how to best solve it. It shows up as different proposals for “standards.” As 
it happens, many proposals for standards often do not get deployed or 
put into widespread use. In other words, new standards frequently get 
deployed in environments where their ultimate success remains uncertain 
long after development.
48 
Consider the following illustration. The deployment of Wi-Fi was 
far from assured. The release of 802.11b in early 1999, which eventually 
become widely deployed, came less than two years after the first beta 
release of a standard for 802.11 in 1997.
49 The first release contained 
multiple problems that simple field experiments revealed, generating two 
later descendants, given the labels “a” and “b.” For numerous reasons “b” 
got deployed first in 1999. Though a fixed version of “a” came soon after, 
its availability did not determine deployment. It never deployed as widely 
to equipment firms. Most had largely already started to deploy “b.”
50 
Another, more current example, and one more representative of the 
complexity and uncertainty pervasive in a standards fight, can be found in 
the market for “unified communications.” These are a series of standard 
designs for making the e-mail, voice-mail, and other communications 
applications work more seamlessly with each other. Both Microsoft and 
IBM have begun to address an enterprise’s communications processes by 
development. Timothy Simcoe, Delay and De Jure Standardization: Exploring the Slowdown in 
Internet Standards Development, in STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 260 (Shane Greenstein 
& Victor Stango eds., 2007); Tim S. Simcoe, Standard Setting Committees (U. Toronto Joseph 
L. Rotman Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper, 2008).  See also I a i n  M .  C o c k b u r n  &  M e g a n  
MacGarvie,  Entry, Exit, and Patenting in the Software Industry (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. W12563, 2006); Iain M. Cockburn & Megan MacGarvie, 
Patents, Thickets, and the Financing of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W13644, 2007) (investigating his 
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offering distinct solutions. 
These solutions do not arise out of the ether. They involve the 
integration of scores of standards into a platform upon which users 
customize their unique needs. Both IBM and Microsoft have had some 
success in developing and selling their solutions, but both have a long 
way to go towards an ideal. As in the above example, we can see that 
often no single firm can resolve a problem for every circumstance. 
Moreover, users may differ in whether they favor one solution or 
another. 
Here is another illustration concerning one of the most interesting 
recent developments—the emergence of platforms at the edges of 
wireless networks. Microsoft has invested in organizing developer 
networks for wireless phones within its CE environment, using its 
platform experience as a guide. Meanwhile, Apple exported to the 
iPhone its experience organizing multiple providers of applications on its 
iPod platform and its Mac platform. Google’s effort with the Android 
represents one alternative method for organizing the platform, and 
Nokia’s recent efforts to develop its own music services and mapping 
services another. Research In Motion, the maker of BlackBerry, has 
organized yet another approach. 
Once again, this competition among distinct platforms, with 
standards embedded in the platform that may not be explicit, can be 
interpreted as competition between bundles of standards. It is far from 
apparent which design offers the right solution for most users. Even the 
most sagacious observer cannot forecast how this competition will evolve 
in the next three years. In light of that intractable uncertainty, the 
availability of many options benefits users. 
This is not to say, however, that standards competition only 
multiplies options. Occasionally such competition comes with substantial 
and durable costs. For example, there may be multiple problems that 
require distinct solutions, but these are inconsistent with one another, 
i.e., choosing one precludes another. In the face of uncertainty about the 
value of various alternatives or their technical efficacy, premature 
commitment to one standard can impose significant costs on later users. 
For example, Internet insiders will recognize that this is the present issue 
hindering different QoS proposals. Some serve to aid one goal but deter 
another.
51 
In short, because standards are extraordinarily important and 
valuable in introducing innovation to the value chain, their development 
and rollout anticipates new services and inventive activity. There also are 
often multiple solutions to similar problems, so competition between 
 51.  See  Ou,  supra note 12. 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  49 
standards proxies for multiple solutions for users. 
Similar to the observation about economic experiments, this 
argument is headed towards a seemingly counter-intuitive observation: 
while this activity may be confusing to all but an insider, this messiness is 
a sign of good health. This may seem an especially surprising conclusion 
to any participant in standards processes. Any reasonably thorough case 
study of the processes behind the design of a standard will emphasize the 
frustration, confusion, and utter plethora of loose ends, even with ample 
funding and a functional certification process. Most participants in 
standards committees come out of the experience with nothing good to 
say about it. 
All this is true, but somewhat irrelevant. More to the point, 
standards competition beats the alternative. 
Think of one of Winston Churchill’s famous quotes: “It has been 
said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time.”
52 Similarly, there is 
only one saving grace for existing standards processes: standards designed 
in the absence of competition are usually much worse. A monopolist’s 
tendency towards orderly, infrequent, and simplified standards leads an 
industry down about as unhealthy an innovative path as it can go. 
If a firm with market power designs a new standard it will face 
strong incentives to roll it out slowly to protect a firm from cannibalizing 
monopoly rents. Sometimes this strategy is obvious. Consider this 
illustration from ancient history: in the days when IBM controlled a large 
part of the mainframe market it could not bring itself to abandon 
Extended Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code (EBCDIC), its 
standardized proprietary language, or, for that matter, to help others 
migrate up from EBCDIC to the many other superior languages 
available. Despite plenty of improvements IBM could have made, its 
managers refused to deploy them, preferring instead to exploit locked-in 
users.
53 
Monopolies also face strong incentives to have a “quiet life,” to 
paraphrase Sir John Hicks.
54 That is, monopolies may exert less effort 
when they choose standards, or design them to castrate user choices in 
such a way that leads to less inconvenience for the monopolist at the 
expense of the user (e.g., trimming product line breadth, or trimming 
away complex attributes of the product). It is less succinct an observation 
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than Hicks’ might have preferred, but here it is: a self-interested firm 
faces strong incentives not to dissipate its profits (through interrupting 
its quiet life) if doing so serves customers in ways that do not generate 
additional revenue. 
That may seem rather abstract, but consider this illustration from 
the good old days of the AT&T monopoly over residential customer 
premise equipment. Until the mid-1970s, most households faced a 
limited menu of (over-engineered and excessively rigid) choices for 
handset designs. Well engineered or not, there were too few choices in 
comparison to what a competitive market would have done. Eliminating 
the monopoly hold over designs led to more than one provider and over 
time showed just how badly the monopoly had done. 
With multiple providers, each provider of customer premise 
equipment matched the offerings of its nearest rivals. In a short time the 
heated and urgent competitive behavior familiar to consumer electronics 
eventually overtook the market, leading to a plethora of choices at a 
range of prices. Compared with the choices found in just Target or 
Walmart today, it is remarkable that anyone in the past thought such a 
limited choice was a good idea.
55 
In other words, in the absence of restraining limitations on 
discretion, monopolies design selfish standards. An antidote to the 
selfish standards of monopolies is competition between standards. 
Indeed, it may be the best antidote. I say that even though very precise 
economic reasoning suggests no such conjecture can ever hold under all 
circumstances.
56 
An intriguing counter-example raised against this proposition is the 
rise of Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) in Europe, the 
first digital cellular standard to be put into wide use, the deployment of 
which led to a blossoming of designs for the European handset market. 
On the surface this experience seems to suggest that government-
mandated standards (in a seemingly monopoly position) can sufficiently 
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nurture a competitive equipment industry. 
The surface view is extremely misleading, and misinterprets the 
actual sequence of events. Upon close examination the rise of GSM is 
not a counter example at all. It rather supports the proposition that 
competition generates a variety of designs and variety helps. That is, 
GSM’s design should be interpreted in light of the competition taking 
place between equipment firms at the time. 
By the time the GSM standard was designed and proposed, most 
participants in the United States anticipated the beginning of 
competition between CDMA and TDMA, which would come at the 
expense of analog systems, supported by a flourishing equipment industry 
led by the U.S.-based Motorola. European equipment firms were 
secondary in commercial leadership. In this context, had the European 
regulators continued to adopt digital standards that already existed in the 
U.S. cellular market or coordinated their efforts with their U.S. 
counterparts,
57 they would have adopted either CDMA, TDMA, or 
both, or left the choice up to the market participants, as the US did. In 
any of those choices Motorola’s existing advantages would have 
continued to have some effect, as it had considerable experience 
supplying for the U.S. and European market. Instead, adopting a new 
standard, such as GSM, wiped the technological slate clean, giving all 
firms—American, European, and Asian—a new opportunity at the new 
market. It did not wipe away all incumbency advantages, which, 
arguably, still arose from experience with distribution and branding. It 
only eliminated the advantage that came from familiarity with analog 
technologies or designs. 
As it turned out, Motorola was quite late in organizing its products 
for GSM based equipment and lost considerable market share to Nokia 
and others during the initial rollout of GSM. Seen in this light, GSM 
was the product of healthy competition between standards, catching an 
incumbent flat-footed. Moreover, Europe today benefits from the 3G 
that came about only because CDMA had the chance to develop in the 
US, a byproduct of economic experiments in different countries. 
Back to the main point: competition between standards also tends 
to beat monopolies because it makes the design process more 
transparent.  Transparent processes are those in which policies let 
participants know what change is imminent. It informs others openly 
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and vocally. In other words, these are processes participants’ actions 
make known—sometimes well in advance—when their change will 
diminish the returns on others’ innovative investments. 
Such transparency is one of the reasons why standards processes 
have become a leading indicator of the imminent release of bleeding edge 
technologies. Interested parties monitor the designs (because they can), 
and know that their near rivals do the same (because the data is available 
to anyone). All those parties plan to match each other along the 
dimension of the standard and differentiate along the dimensions in 
which each has competitive advantage. Competition ensues once the 
standard is upgraded from its beta to an endorsed and official standard. 
  Transparency is a feature found quite frequently in sponsored open 
source projects, but it is not unique to that setting. It can be found in 
standards processes. It is thought to have great importance in 
interdependent value chains. Other firms will not make long-term 
investments if they cannot understand at a fine level of detail how their 
software must interact with another’s. 
Open source observers find that transparency can lead to more 
participatory decision making for standards.
58 Participatory processes are 
those in which sponsoring organizations invite comment, discussion, and 
input from others affected by their actions. Such organizations solicit 
input through public forums, e-mail lists, blogs, community sites, and a 
range of other activities. 
Standards organizations vary considerably in their policies for 
encouraging or discouraging participation. For example, some 
organizations require fees, some require participants to meet certain 
technical qualifications, and others will allow any observer to attend, 
though not vote. 
Wide participation is also found quite frequently in open source 
projects, particularly those without sponsorship. Wikipedia, though non-
profit, is perhaps the best-known example of an online project that 
encourages wide participation. The Firefox browser community has quite 
diverse participation from numerous corners. So, too, does Linux. In 
both the latter cases, most participants are quite technically skilled.  
However, wide participation is probably the least common attribute 
among standards consortia sponsored by commercial private firms. Most 
m a n a g e r s  p r e f e r  t o  r e t a i n  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  a u t h o r i t y ,  g u a r d i n g  
investment decisions in the name of stockholders. There is concern that 
giving up such discretion risks having participants take investment in 
directions that do not serve firm interests.
59 
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Accommodating wide participation normally comes at a cost, such 
as slower decision making and more onerous managerial challenges 
coming to consensus. That is one reason why Tim Berners-Lee 
established the W3C with a less participatory structure than found in the 
IETF, where he had personally experienced the drawbacks of slow 
decision making when he first tried to standardize the core inventions 
behind the World Wide Web.
60 
Competition between standards is not what Wall Street analysis 
values. By definition, competing standards raise the risks for those with 
stakes in past standards (which might become obsolete) or it raises risks 
for those who will face competitors or entrepreneurial entrants 
employing new standards. Once again, it is not unusual to observe a little 
messiness, and there is no particular reason to anticipate the new 
standards to yield immediate profitability.  
Contemporary Internet infrastructure contains signs of vigorous 
standards competition. For example, Wi-Max and LTE vie today for 
next generation wireless data markets. One or both technologies, as 
implemented and deployed by commercial firms, might very well turn 
out to be an unprofitable flop, but until we know that for sure, they 
provide potential competition for the community of firms and 
researchers interested in developing high-speed data transmission in the 
near future. That fuels a sense of urgency and gets the government 
bureaucracies behind wireless telephony to move quickly when they 
otherwise might not have. The threat can be sufficient to generate earlier 
investment than later investment. 
While competition among standards tends to broadly yield good 
outcomes for all users and firms, there is an important exception. From 
time to time the rollout of a new standard involves a “coalition” of firms 
who have signed up for one design, opposing another “coalition” who has 
signed up for another. Such coalitions emerged in the HD DVD versus 
Blu-Ray fight, the Wi-Fi versus Home-RF fights, and the 56K Flex 
versus X2 fights, which are among many examples from the last decade. 
In fights between coalitions, the battle is good for everyone, except, 
perhaps, those in the losing coalition of a big standards battle. The losing 
coalition may expend considerable resources for which its members do 
not gain returns. 
Though more complex, a similar dynamic exists in competition 
between organizations for control of governance over standards. 
Competition between groups, organizations, and communities is a good 
thing in general, even if specific participants lose out on occasion. 
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Competition between organizations is different than competition 
between designs, however: competition between organizations may 
involve competition between alternative designs of standards, but it often 
involves competition between commitments to different processes in the 
future for upgrading the standards as well. The latter involves choices 
between commitments by specific communities of managers, 
technologists, and/or sponsoring firms. 
The history of the Internet itself provides the best illustration of this 
lesson.
61 Development of TCP/IP as a foundation for a national network 
occurred in the presence of an alternative process and model for the same 
activity, organized by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO). Competition between organizations led to development of data 
exchange standards sooner than otherwise would have occurred had the 
ISO made the decision all by itself. The reverse is also true. Competition 
from ISO generated urgency within the communities of the Internet 
Architecture Board (IAB) and eventually the IETF to organize their 
myriad ideas and implement them quickly. 
Looking more closely, this competition stressed more than merely 
different designs, which illustrates why competition between groups is 
not perfectly analogous to competition between technologies. 
Throughout the latter part of the 1980s there were two processes for 
determining standards. One process existed at the ISO, and it 
emphasized committee consensus in advance of deployment, with 
committees comprising representatives of all major stakeholders. 
Another existed among the descendants of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), organized around activities at the 
IAB, who established the IETF midway through the decade. Their 
process stressed bottom-up suggestions and demonstrating workable 
solutions before adoption.
62 
As it turned out, a bottom-up process centered in the United States 
made considerably more pragmatic progress, but even that was due to 
more than just its bottom-up nature. Even from its earliest days, IETF 
leadership did its best to aid the process it governed. First, it tried to 
provide editorial guidance and support for the entire process. That 
resulted in remarkably clear and comprehensive documentation 
(particularly from some contributors who were not practiced at clarity 
and thoroughness). 
Second, the IETF also helped coordinate and sponsor “plugfests” 
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where vendors could test their interoperability of actual implementations. 
In principle, these fests were used to verify the existence of “running 
code” before advancing a proposal for an RFC to a final draft. Those 
efforts provided the administrative glue to accumulate technical 
suggestions from many disparate corners.
63  
In these examples we see the benefits of messy clashes between 
organizations over their domains of expertise and even over the proper 
processes for making technical progress. It infuses decisions with a 
healthy tension concerning multiple options. It might be irritating for 
the participants involved, but the sniping results from a healthy diversity 
of opinion in the face of opportunity. 
In sum, these clashes beat any outcome likely to arise in the 
presence of monopoly provision of standards. 
Just as with unfettered experimentation, competition between 
standards and between the organizations that sponsor them yields a 
benefit. It may lead to innovative entrants, or it may enhance the 
products of one particular firm. It forces incumbents to react, or, even 
better yet, anticipate the entrant and innovate in advance. This fosters 
incentives to lower prices and to sponsor more innovative products 
sooner, thereby benefiting users. 
C. Inventive  Entrepreneurialism 
Entrepreneurial initiatives involve an organization in a risky and 
challenging business in pursuit of a new economic opportunity. These 
firms are the “participant” that makes the first intrepid attempts at 
deploying, distributing, or servicing a new good to a wide range of 
customers with the intent of making a profit. Small start-ups take 
entrepreneurial action and so do large firms. Sometimes small businesses 
that take such risks are bought by large organizations, such as Cisco, 
IBM, or Microsoft. Sometimes small start-ups go public and grow into 
large firms themselves. 
While the addition of more and more entrepreneurs (after some 
point) does not always make a situation better, their complete absence is 
a sign of poor innovative health. The presence of entrepreneurs provides 
the simplest benchmark. 
It might be tempting to use the presence of start-ups funded by 
venture capitalists or angel investors as a measure of the presence of 
entrepreneurship. That is not precise or even accurate in today’s markets. 
To be clear, while most start-ups involve entrepreneurs, not all 
entrepreneurs must have venture funding. Entrepreneurship also arises 
inside small divisions of corporations, or stems from corporate funding of 
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spin-offs and other corporate ventures. In other words, not all innovation 
comes from start-ups and venture capitalists. 
Indeed, there are good reasons why entrepreneurship inside large 
firms does not resemble entrepreneurial actions undertaken by small 
firms. If large firms go after the same business opportunities as small and 
medium firms, it is not surprising that they will take heterogeneous 
approaches to the same opportunity. For example, small firms may have 
the advantages of dexterity and surprise, while the large have the 
advantages of established brands, distribution channels, and strong 
feedback networks with existing users. The large firm will tailor its 
actions to its advantages. 
The following is also true: both VC-funded entrepreneurs and all 
other kinds tend to be present at the same time in the same settings 
chasing the same opportunities. And so the low points are most 
informative: the absence of any start-ups is a pretty reliable signal of 
hostile environment for innovative, entrepreneurial young firms.
64 
Recent history reinforces this point. The increasing presence of 
entrepreneurs in communications markets has been one of the sweetest 
developments in the last two decades. It has brought rapid change to 
many sub-markets. Today we take for granted our access to e-mail, 
instant messaging, IP-enabled video conferencing, picture sharing, 
amateur-video sharing, online mapping, accessible hosted CRM 
applications from any location, mobile push e-mail, and a host of other 
utilities that no non-technical individual can understand. In virtually 
every case of radical change the events did not arise solely from the 
actions of incumbent firms with existing businesses. At some point, 
entrepreneurial actions got involved. 
Three benefits are affiliated with the presence of a variety of 
entrepreneurs in comparison to their complete absence. Entrepreneurs 
have incentives to differentiate from incumbent firms who over-commit 
to one technological forecast about direction of change.
65 A related 
benefit has to do with overcoming inadequacies in establish 
organizations. Even if established firms have incentives t o  p u r s u e  a  
portfolio of technical directions, they may fail to act on them due to the 
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absence of internal champions for a new technical direction, or the 
protection of rents flowing to internal champions.
66 Once again, 
entrepreneurs view such situations as opportunities. Third, when it is 
unclear which of several technical directions is most valuable, society 
gains from pursuing a variety of the least cost alternatives. 
Entrepreneurship can foster investments from distinct firms with 
different cost structures, each of them facing heterogenous incentives to 
invest in the technology. 
The best historical illustration of these ideas comes from the 
development of the Internet itself, as it transitioned from its academic 
origins into a commercial service.
67 Executives at many established firms, 
such as AT&T and IBM, simply did not invest in operations nurturing 
any commercial future for TCP/IP services, even into the early 1990s. 
Some entrepreneurs viewed that as an opportunity and acted according to 
their vision. Thus, the initial growth of the commercial Internet involved 
a mix of firms from a variety of backgrounds. They shared a vision that 
the Internet would grow. 
Some, such as PSINet and UUNet, were entrepreneurial 
descendents from the NSFNet. Others, such as Netscape, involved 
personnel from university research laboratories and executives from prior 
entrepreneurial commercial ventures. Others, such as those at BBN and 
MCI, were entrepreneurial actors inside large enterprises, who came 
from quite distinct backgrounds and interests. Others still were small 
Internet Service Providers, descendents from the bulletin board industry, 
who saw opportunities to establish a new service for local customer 
base.
68  
Because entrepreneurs often are the first to perform an economic 
experiment with a newly designed standard, a market with thriving 
entrepreneurial activity often results from the same factors that 
encourage a healthy amount of economic experimentation and standards 
competition. Yet, other factors matter, too. Entrepreneurial activity also 
can increase and decrease for distinct reasons. 
Three additional factors play a role in encouraging 
entrepreneurship: low development costs, fast speed to 
commercialization, and strong appropriability conditions as defined by 
the eco-system. These are important to recognize because pragmatic 
policy can shape these factors.  
Development costs and speed to commercialization refer to two 
attributes of every young firm’s experience, i.e., the expense before 
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shipping the first major release and the amount of time it takes. Both of 
these are usually measured from the time a young firm first gets its 
funding, or its founders assign full-time managerial responsibility to 
somebody for the development of a product, whichever comes first. 
T o  g i v e  a  s e n s e  o f  s c a l e  t o  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  I n t e r n e t  m a r k e t s  
consider this example: Netscape was founded in April 1994 and sought 
to ship its first beta browser in four months. In fact, it took slightly 
longer. The first beta browser shipped in November 1994, its official 
product in February 1995. That effort involved several million dollars for 
a few months of development work and initial distribution.
69 That was at 
the high end of software development costs. A typical application firm in 
the late 1990s was expected to burn through several million dollars in a 
couple years. A typical software firm was expected to launch its first 
product in less than year, perhaps more if the product was particularly 
complex. 
In comparison most examples of young software firms from this 
decade are astoundingly inexpensive until they scale up. Using open 
source software, modern startups have tended to work just as fast or 
faster, and with considerably less expense. For example, YouTube went 
from founding to first service in less than three months, entirely financed 
on the credit cards of one of the founders.
70 They did not bring in 
millions of dollars of working capital from any venture capitalist—in this 
case, Sequoia Capital—until they needed to scale their server equipment 
and support personnel to accommodate their spectacular growth. 
That is not an isolated example. In general, it is quite common for 
the software firms of the Web 2.0 movement to burn no more than a few 
hundred thousand dollars a year and operate with less than a couple 
dozen employees. Many programmers with Web 2.0 startups boast about 
their ability to survive on “ramen profitability”—just enough revenue to 
buy ramen noodles for a couple founders for a while until it finds a 
service with wide appeal.
71 Even after funding, many firms can 
 69.  MICHAEL  CUSUMANO  &  DAVID  YOFFIE,  COMPETING ON INTERNET  TIME, 
LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE AND ITS BATTLE WITH MICROSOFT (1998). 
 70.  David  Greising,  YouTube Founder Rides Video Clips to Dot-Com Riches, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, Oct. 15, 2006; Scott Woolley, Video Fixation, FORBES, Oct. 16, 2006. 
  71. This phrase is due to Paul Graham. The earliest use appears to be from an essay 
dated May 2005, in an essay “Hiring is obsolete.” He states, 
Like everything else in technology, the cost of starting a startup has decreased 
dramatically. Now it’s so low that it has disappeared into the noise. The main cost 
of starting a Web-based startup is food and rent. Which means it doesn’t cost much 
more to start a company than to be a total slacker. You can probably start a startup 
on ten thousand dollars of seed funding, if you’re prepared to live on ramen. The 
less it costs to start a company, the less you need the permission of investors to do it. 
So a lot of people will be able to start companies now who never could have before.  
The phrase “ramen-profitability” emerged from those origins, and has diffused into wider use. 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  59 
accomplish amazing tasks with few permanent staff. I have toured 
numerous start-ups that operate with less than ten employees, and they 
intend to stay that way until they get their product into mass markets, at 
which point they will expand to less than a few dozen. 
In other words, modern Web start-ups generally face low 
development costs, and anticipate a small scale for a long period of their 
earliest development, prior to scaling for a mass market. They all dream 
of reaching a mass market quickly, to be sure. If they do not it is not 
their end. They can survive and experiment for a long period.  
Generalizations about the level of entrepreneurship that signal a 
healthy level of such activity are hard to make, not surprisingly. Some 
determinants of development costs and speed are outside the control of 
any participant. Those need to be distinguished from determinants of 
development costs and speed within the control of some participants. 
Here is an example of determinants outside the control of 
entrepreneurs. Level3 entered the backbone market in the late 1990s at 
hi gh  e x p e n se ,  b ur n in g  t hr o u gh h un d r e d s  o f m i l lio n s o f d o l la r s a  y e a r  
(maybe billions) while it built thousands of miles of new lines for its 
national network.
72 While Level3 initially was able to receive top dollar 
in revenue for its new all-IP infrastructure, its example was not followed 
by any other entrant. 
Indeed, once the contract prices fell for backbone services in 2000-
01,
73 no large new entry was observed in the backbone market except 
Cogent (which began service in 1999). Cogent largely did not build its 
own network. Instead, it put together its network from the assets of 
previously bankrupt firms,
74 vaguely reminiscent of how Cornell 
See Josh Quittner, The New Internet Startup Boom: Get Rich Slow, TIME, Apr. 9, 2009. 
  72.  The company’s own web site boasts of something similar. It says,  
During 1998, Level 3 raised $14 billion and was called the ‘best funded start-up in 
history.’ The company constructed 19,600 route miles, and built the world’s first 
continuously upgradeable network fully optimized for internet protocol (IP). Over 
the next few years, explosive demand for bandwidth fueled growth in sales. By the 
end of 2000, Level 3 provided service to 2,700 customers. 
Level 3 Communications, A Network Built to Support the Silicon Economics Cycle, 
http://www.level3.com/index.cfm?pageID=245 (last visited Apr. 2009). Other web sites aimed 
at investors say something similar but in less generous language. For example, as recounted on 
fundinguniverse.com, Level 3’s executives “secured rights of way from railroad companies and 
ordered legions of employees to dig trenches and lay cable, efforts that quickly exhausted 
billions of dollars in capital.” Fundinguniverse.com, Level 3 Communications, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Level-3-Communications-Inc-
Company-History.html (last visited Apr. 2009). 
 73.  Greg  Rosston,  The Rise and fall of Third Party High Speed Access, 23 INFO. ECON. & 
POL’Y 21, 29 (2009). 
  74.  On their company history web page they state:  
Although debuting at the height of the telecom industry, Cogent soon found vast 
market wealth eradicated and many other ISPs thrown into a state of turmoil. In a 
survival of the fittest competition, Cogent became the consolidator in a 60  J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol.  8 
assembled Western Union back in his day. The basic economics of entry 
suggest that new building is not justified when prices fall, capacity goes 
unused, and growth can be achieved through restructuring. Simply 
stated, the costs are too high to merit building a new frontier start-up, no 
matter how good they are. (Constructing a new firm from existing assets 
bought at fire-sale prices, apparently, is a different matter.) 
Here is an example of determinants within the control of some 
participants. For the last decade Intel has released prototype designs for 
the inside of the PC and endorsed specific implementations. That action 
has reduced the costs of designing some components and speeded the 
development of others. It has fueled considerable entrepreneurial 
activity.
75 
Selective withholding of information also can serve strategic 
purposes that delay entrepreneurial competition. Intel was accused of 
actions, in particular of withholding technical information from other 
participants in a quid pro quo for licensing of its intellectual property, 
which generated an FTC investigation.
76 Outsiders frequently accused 
Microsoft of using its position to make its own life easier, such as 
documenting for Microsoft’s use but not necessarily for any others’, and 
not documenting code so the company could alter it to its advantage.
77 
Three aspects of these types of allegations deserve notice. First, they 
are extremely difficult to prove in court (at least in ways that lawyers and 
judges find satisfying). Second, once leveled, these allegations take on a 
life of their own, and continue on in many distorted forms in (on-line) 
consolidating market. Over three brief years, Cogent completed 13 acquisitions of 
other flailing providers. Whether it was an entire company or just select assets, 
Cogent was able to acquire valuable network assets, customers, peering relationships 
and building access agreements for pennies on the dollar. 
Cogentco.com, Cogent Communication History, http://www.cogentco.com/us/ 
about_history.php (last visited Apr. 2009). 
  75. See,  e.g.,  GAWER & CUSUMANO, supra note 21; Gawer & Henderson, supra note 21. 
  76. In  re  Intel Corp., 128 F.T.C. 213 (1999). 
  77.  One developer suggests the following: 
Why [not document part of the internal subsystem for Win32], one might ask? 
Well, the official reasoning is that it allows Microsoft to tune and modify the system 
call layer at will, improving performance and adding features without being forced 
to provide backward compatibility application binary interfaces . . . . The more 
nefarious reasoning is that it allows Microsoft applications to cheat, and call directly 
into the undocumented Win32 subsystem system call interface to provide services 
that competing applications cannot. Several Microsoft applications were 
subsequently discovered to be doing just that, of course . . . . These days, this is less 
of a problem, as there are several books that document this system call layer . . . . 
But it left a nasty taste in the mouths of many early Windows NT developers 
(myself included). 
Jeremy Allison, A Tale of Two Standards, in O PEN  SOURCES  2.0:  THE  CONTINUING 
EVOLUTION 47 (Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper & Mark Stone eds., O’Reilly Media, Inc. 
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communities that mistrust the leading firm who stands accused. Third, 
such allegations usually presume the dominant firm could have acted 
differently, i.e., in a manner more considerate to the interests of other 
entrepreneurs, without much cost. 
Internet insiders will recognize a familiar outline in the debate over 
Comcast’s throttling of Bit-Torrent traffic. Many accusations have been 
leveled at Comcast for throttling traffic. When the behavior was first 
discovered, it unleashed more than a bit of torrent of speculation in 
online discussion groups about the extent of the action and the 
competitive motivation.
78 Not only did the lack of advance notification 
leave many parties suspicious about Comcast’s policies, but it left 
observers puzzled about why it never dawned on management to issue a 
press release before taking action. Comcast’s secrecy fueled rumors, and 
it came across as unnecessarily inconsiderate to users, entrepreneurs, and 
other on-line participants.  
The final attribute of every young firm’s experience is something 
called appropriability conditions. I t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  e a s e  w i t h  w h i c h  
entrepreneurs can retain exclusive rights over their inventions or other 
unique assets, usually through one of several strategies to prevent 
imitation: secrecy, patents, copyright, first mover advantages, or some 
combination of those. If conditions are weak, then entrepreneurs expect 
to lose quickly their unique advantages to others 
Appropriability conditions are controversial for reasons related to 
the discussion about withholding information. They partly depend on 
the tenor of interfirm relationships in the competitive ecosystem 
constructed by leading incumbent firms. This factor has received 
attention by many others, so this discussion will remain brief. 
For example, some incumbent firms, such as Cisco, have made it 
very clear that they intend to purchase other small start-ups who reach 
the frontier in an area Cisco considers important. That is regarded as a 
quite inviting setting for start-ups. Similarly, during its heyday in the late 
1990s, AOL was known for its willingness to sign a reasonable deal with 
just about any start-up who had a service to offer for its platform. 
Venture capitalists also took note of these positions and started firms 
accordingly. 
In contrast, for many years Microsoft was known to prefer internal 
growth over acquisitions, usually in a fast-follower strategy, i.e., basing 
development on the lessons learned through the economic experiment 
  78. See, e.g., PETER ECKERSLEY, FRED VON LOHMANN & SETH SCHOEN, PACKET 
FORGERY  BY  ISPS:  A  REPORT ON THE COMCAST  AFFAIR, ELECTRONIC  FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.eff.org/files/eff_comcast_report2.pdf; Comcast 
Throttles BitTorrent Traffic, Seeding Impossible, TORRENT  FREAK, Aug. 17, 2007, 
http://torrentfreak.com/comcast-throttles-bittorrent-traffic-seeding-impossible. 62  J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol.  8 
conducted by other firms. That did not deter entry in application 
software, but it motivated firms to start young companies with no 
planning for acquisition, and to expect the potential for imitation from 
the very firm with whom they had to partner in order to reach users. 
More recently, Microsoft has changed its stance about acquisitions, 
particularly in areas related to cloud computing, and that has raised a 
number of questions among VCs about funding firms in related areas. 
The legal environment also shapes appropriability conditions. This, 
too, has received much attention from others, so for this discussion I will 
keep my observations brief. For example, the changing legal and 
regulatory conditions of the late 1990s adversely affected the basic costs 
and viability of a wide range of CLEC business plans. To say the least, 
the environment went from friendly to hostile in a few years, and, not 
surprisingly, entry of young start-ups declined as a result.
79 
As noted earlier, large firms and incumbent firms can be 
entrepreneurial, too. That is why some entrepreneurial actions by large 
firms, though otherwise puzzling, may have a silver lining. For example, 
Nokia continues to struggle to find new initiatives beyond hardware 
design, whether it involves buying Navteq or starting new music services 
that anger its carrier partners. In light of the relevance of 
entrepreneurship, we should salute them. As the provider of almost half 
the smart phones in the world
80 and close to 40% of all cell phones, 
Nokia has considerable clout. Yet it refuses to stand still. It continues to 
restructure, a sign of taking entrepreneurial risks in advance of new 
opportunities in new markets. 
As another example, Cisco’s attempt to get into video conferencing 
by purchasing Webex seems strategically incongruent, because it involves 
integrating a large software firm into one that specializes in equipment 
markets. Yet, the merger also introduces the company to a wide range of 
new opportunities and challenges related to developing tele-presence. 
Even if I am skeptical that Cisco will gain a return on its investment in 
Webex, I am interested to see what it makes of its entrepreneurial action 
and this departure from prior strategic action. 
Once again, established firms with market power do not tend to 
benefit from entrepreneurial inventiveness that threatens their economic 
rents. That raises concerns that dominant firms will attempt to shape 
development costs, entry speeds, and appropriability conditions to serve 
 79.  NUECHTERLEIN  &  WEISER,  supra note 12, at 15–16, 69–114 (examining the 
tension between the competitive goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the 
unavoidability of economies of scale); see also Greenstein & Mazzeo, Differentiated Entry into 
Competitive Telephony, 54 J. INDUS. ECON. 323–350 (Sept. 2006). 
  80.  Kevin O’Marah, Feasting on a Content Economy: Nokia Bites Apple, AMR RESEARCH, 
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its own strategic priorities. For example, established firms would rather 
buy out an entrepreneurial inventor than see it become an independent 
company and potentially compete. 
Once again, Wall Street analysts may stress different factors than 
those that benefit society at large or users. In part that is because the 
value of many start-ups may be privately held for some time, not 
evaluated by any stock market pricing, as with established firms. In 
addition, as with a multiplicity of economic experiments and the 
regularity of standards competition, there are general benefits to buyers 
from competition between start-ups and established firms that Wall 
Street does not necessarily value. Even when such start-ups have only 
small chances of success in the long term, such competition enlarges 
buyer choice, multiples opportunities for learning, and enhances urgency 
at the established organizations. 
More broadly, just as with unfettered experimentation and 
competition between standards, entrepreneurial inventiveness yields 
benefits at the level of the market even if the benefits are small at the 
level of the firm. Such entrepreneurship will serve a purpose in the plans 
of innovative entrants. It will generate reactions from other competitors 
or imitators. Once again, this fosters incentives that ultimately lead to 
lower prices and more innovative products, and sooner. Users benefit 
from that, and policy can encourage it. 
D.  Absence of Unilateral Bargaining 
Negotiation shows up in every firm’s life. From some of the above 
examples, it is easy to see why: suppliers complain about growing costs 
and suggest alternatives, technologists suggest alternative methods for 
accomplishing a task, programmers complain about the poor quality of 
code and seek to push out release dates, stockholders demand higher 
profits, buyers complain about tight budgets and threaten to choose 
another option. Managers caught between such complaints must 
constantly negotiate with many participants. More to the point, 
managers inside the Internet value chain have an especially difficult task 
because the addition of technical interrelatedness adds one more layer of 
complexity to an already tough negotiating task. 
In a network with a high degree of technical interrelatedness, there 
are general gains to all parties from bringing routines into business 
processes and activities, much like there are gains to adopting standards 
and platforms to coordinate activities. While there may be no better way 
to reduce complexity, adopting such routines may require negotiation 
between multiple parties.  
Such negotiation offers no guarantee of success. Many outcomes are 
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one party will desire it more than the other. Alternatively, one party may 
have an ability to generate a better deal than the other, and sees 
bargaining as an opportunity to generate a strategic advance or gain 
additional revenue. As a general rule, the structure of bargaining 
sometimes can work out to a Goldilocks equilibrium that is just right—
not too hot and not too cold—but more often it does not. One firm gets 
too powerful or another prominent bargainer loses its way. 
In the extreme, bargaining becomes one-sided, with one party 
asking for something while the other refuses to provide it or only agrees 
to it at a high cost. The simplest manifestation of this extreme situation 
arises when the more powerful party declares a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer, 
leaving other parties no choice. 
Given such a range of possible outcomes, how can we tell what 
signifies a healthy market? In short, the absence of one-sided bargaining. 
That said, it is not as simple as it sounds. The presence of one-sided 
bargaining by itself is not bad. That is, the absence of one-sided 
bargaining is a sign of health, while the presence of one-sided bargaining 
is a sign of potential illness, which might have adverse consequences that 
might spread. The key question is whether the parties who receive such 
take-it-or-leave-it offers have access to reasonable alternatives. This will 
take some explaining. 
Let me illustrate the role of negotiations with a comparatively 
uncontroversial example. Intel has a series of agreements with numerous 
OEMs about putting the Intel Inside and Centrino brands on their 
products to signal to users that the laptop includes a Wi-Fi compatible 
motherboard and antennae designed by Intel. In addition, Intel often 
includes certain compensation for the marketing expenses of putting the 
Intel copyrighted jingle inside a commercial. 
A breakdown of negotiations can arise from one-sided bargaining, 
but this example illustrates that breakdowns can occur for other reasons 
as well. A few years ago Dell refused to carry the Centrino branded 
systems, and, accordingly, did not receive the quid pro quo 
compensation. Both parties went on their merry way for many years. Dell 
continued to carry both Intel products, but after that incident began to 
more prominently distribute designs with AMD chips. At the same time 
Intel reached deals with every other major OEM, and succeeded in 
making Centrino a feature of the majority of notebooks in use. 
What does this example illustrate? First, that Intel’s market power 
had its limits with Dell. It eventually reached a point in its negotiation 
with Dell where Intel gave Dell a take-it-or-leave-it offer and, indeed, 
Dell chose to leave it (unlike virtually everyone else in the industry). 
Second, as long as Dell had plenty of other options, the losses to Dell or 
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since Dell’s choices translated into more buyer options beyond the 
Centrino. 
One-sided bargaining can have some serious consequences, 
however. Some years ago there was a proposal to let all Internet 
participants simply negotiate compensation between them, so that 
Google/Yahoo/Disney would negotiate with Comcast/Time-
Warner/Verizon, and every other possible combination. Intel’s example 
suggests the problem with such a proposal: imagine the uproar among 
users in the locations where such negotiations failed to come to 
resolution and no other close substitutes existed. It would be far worse 
than the brief uproar last year among Yankee fans who could not get 
local baseball telecasts due to a negotiation breakdown between Major 
Leagues Baseball, the Yankees, and a local cable provider. 
Indeed, this did happen a few years ago when negotiations broke 
down between Cogent and Sprint.
81 However, the situation was easy to 
misunderstand and misinterpret. In this case, the absence of market 
power reduced the policy concerns affiliated with the breakdown of 
bargaining, albeit some policy concerns still remained. That requires 
explanation. 
Specifically, Cogent and Sprint were exchanging traffic through a 
third party and, like other backbone firms, sought to connect directly in a 
peering arrangement that bypassed the third party.
82 That is not a trivial 
step. First, it required the building of appropriate lines and equipment, 
which cost money. Second, as with other peering, it required measuring 
traffic directly to verify that traffic was sufficiently symmetrical back and 
forth. The two firms negotiated an agreement for building the 
connection and the terms for breach—that is, what type of traffic 
experience would justify ending the peering. 
After building this connection, Cogent stated that it was satisfied 
with the traffic flow, while Sprint stated it was not. There was no dispute 
about the symmetry of the traffic back and forth, but there was a 
disagreement about its level. Sprint argued that Cogent did not provide 
enough traffic to justify a peering relationship.
83 
After declaring Cogent could no longer peer with it, Sprint did not 
immediately de-peer. Rather, it unilaterally declared that the two 
companies were in a paying relationship, as Sprint would do with any 
small ISP. Sprint then began to send bills to Cogent. Cogent argued that 
it had met the conditions for peering, and that Sprint’s claims were 
 81.  Scott  Woolley,  The Day the Web Went Dead, FORBES.COM, Dec. 2, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/01/cogent-sprint-regulation-tech-enter-
cz_sw_1202cogent.html. 
  82. Id. 
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disingenuous attempts to make money. In essence, Cogent refused to 
pay, and both companies put considerable spin on events.
84 
This standoff went on for many months until Sprint’s management 
decided to shut down its side of the peering.
85 That action had 
consequences for users on both networks who did not multi-home, i.e., 
did not use more than one backbone firm. One set of exclusive Sprint 
users could not reach another set of exclusive Cogent users.
86 
T o  m a k e  a  l o n g  s t o r y  s h o r t ,  u s e r s  o f  b o t h  c a r r i e r s  w e r e  a n g r y .  
Cogent publically blamed Sprint’s decision to de-peer, and, for reasons 
not made public, after a few days Sprint’s management gave in, reversing 
the de-peering.
87 Soon after the two firms came to a long-term 
agreement whose details were not disclosed publically.
88 In other words, 
as of this writing, this negotiating tactic hurt users, but it is unclear 
which firm won the negotiation. It is not clear how much money 
changed hands (or will change hands). 
The Sprint-Cogent case suggests four lessons. First, any outcome 
depends on the circumstances surrounding the use of the tactic. No 
generality could hold for all circumstances. Second, user (dis)satisfaction 
plays a role in those negotiations, but it is not the only determinant. 
Third, any rule about interconnection will have tactical consequences for 
users. For example, a must-carry rule for interconnection would simply 
have narrowed the set of actions Sprint could take. 
The fourth lesson is more subtle. Several news stories tried to make 
an inference about the managerial style of Cogent’s CEO, Dave Schaffer, 
since this is not the first negotiation breakdown his firm has 
encountered. That focus misses the forest for the trees. The personality 
of a CEO is not the point. Only his entrepreneurial vision is, because at 
the heart of this example lies a potential competition policy issue. 
Specifically, Cogent has a “entrepreneurial” distinct vision about 
how to attract customers and serve their needs. To execute that vision 
Cogent necessarily must interact or exchange traffic with the very firms 
with whom it competes. It is not hard to interpret negotiation 
breakdown initiated by an incumbent firm as a tactic to discourage an 
entrepreneurial vision and deter an economic experiment by an entrant. 
In general, competition policy issues always arise any time an existing 
firm can shape the costs of an entrepreneurial entrant. If further 
 84.  Id. 
  85. Id. 
  86. Numerous computer scientists and networking experts have pointed out to me that 
both Sprint and Cogent could have adjusted their routing tables in advance to prevent users 
from being cutoff. Hence, there is a sense in which both parties played brinkmanship and bear 
responsibility for imposing costs on their users. 
 87.  Woolley,  supra note 81. 
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investigation reveals that Sprint possessed market power, their refusal to 
interconnect would be especially disturbing. 
In other words, if Sprint were found to have market power, then its 
attempts to bargain over interconnection are potentially more 
problematic.
89 Its actions could be interpreted as an attempt to shape 
competition. 
One tactical gain from market power, for example, is the ability to 
ignore customer complaints at the retail level while pursuing other 
tactical goals, say, at the wholesale level, where interconnection takes 
place. It appears that Sprint’s capitulation to its user base is, however, 
evidence that Sprint’s management does not have the ability to ignore its 
users for very long. 
I raised this example for a reason. In short, one-sided negotiations 
and bargaining breakdowns are, by themselves, insufficient to conclude 
definitively there is a problem. In the presence of market power, 
however, it is much more likely a sign of lack of innovative health. 
Now consider the lessons from negotiated arrangements that are a 
bit more one-sided, and happened in the presence of market power. 
These days Apple offers a standard contract to all application developers 
for the iPhone about how their services will be sold, requiring them to 
sign non-disclosure agreements as a condition for inclusion on the Apple 
Web page where applications are sold. 
What dispute arose? Developers complained that the non-disclosure 
agreement was too tight, even for firms whose applications were 
ultimately rejected. This made headlines when Apple “clarified” its 
policies, announcing that even the non-disclosure letter was subject to 
the non-disclosure agreement.
90 Apple argued that anything done by a 
developer for Apple could not be shared with others, even if Apple 
refused it for the iPhone after review. After considerable uproar on blogs 
and developer list serves,
91 Apple relented on this provision, but it 
continued to argue that it had a right to protect its innovations through 
use of these agreements.
92 
Once again, Apple made a take-it-or-leave-it offer and imposed 
conditions on others. The negotiation breakdown was not necessarily 
symptomatic of a problem, however, as long as alternatives existed. In 
  89. Because events suggest that Sprint in fact lacked market power, I am not concluding 
that Sprint acted in an attempt to shape competition. 
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this case, however, not many alternatives existed for reaching Apple 
iPhone users. If a developer wanted to reach the Apple user-base they 
had to distribute through Apple’s outlets and accept the condition. No 
other avenue for reaching them existed. Apple controlled them all. 
If other devices are substitutes for the Apple iPhone, then this 
situation is less worrisome. If developers wanted to reach users through 
alternative devices for mobile computing, they had to reach deals with 
those device providers. Initially few existed, but increasingly 
announcements are being made about new entry. As some gain market 
share, the situation may change. 
These examples illustrate several general points. Breakdown 
happens for many reasons, and those should be considered distinct from 
the reasons shaping one-sided negotiations, which can look similar. 
One-sided negotiations, in contrast, involve one party with enough 
bargaining power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer that others have no 
choice but to accept. 
What factors mitigate the public policy issues in Apple’s case? 
Generally speaking, suppliers in young markets get wider licenses from a 
court just because they produce for a nascent set of users for new devices 
and services. For many good reasons there is a general presumption that 
no firm introducing a new product has market power at the early stage of 
growth, as it is subject to competition from established brands with 
established distribution channels and large market share. 
So why does Apple get any scrutiny at all? Questions arose here 
because Apple is unique. The attention is a testament to Apple’s unusual 
recent success commercializing small devices, such as the iPod, and its 
rather unique place today as a firm that every developer expects to 
succeed with users, even with a new product, unlike just about every 
other firm. 
Perhaps a more famous example of one-sided bargaining came from 
Microsoft in the mid 1990s. While I do not mean to single out 
Microsoft in the use of one-sided negotiations, several circumstances 
contribute to a disproportionate number of examples in the essay from 
Microsoft’s conduct in the 1990s. First, due to the antitrust trial,
93 many 
of its internal memos became public, providing a unique and well-
documented window on how such negotiations were conducted. Second, 
Bill Gates was remarkably adept at pressing his negotiating advantages 
when he had them. His behavior provides good illustrations of how one-
sided negotiations can become. Third, and similar to the Apple example, 
many developers wanted access to the users of Windows. However, in 
this case, the alternatives were quite limited, and, so, courts had no issue 
  93.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  69 
concluding that Microsoft’s attempts to make access more or less difficult 
for those developers had real consequences.
94 The user base for Windows 
was large, so the stakes were quite high for many developers if they faced 
even a small degree of problems.
95 
For instance, prior to the rollout of Windows 95, Microsoft began 
to dictate conditions to its application developers. It started mildly, with 
design specifications that application providers were required to comply 
with, such as specifications for pull-down menus, and other processes 
that had to follow the available APIs. Most firms acquiesced to these for 
lack of any alternative, and some grumbled about it at the time. 
The more controversial dictates started showing up closer to the 
rollout of the system. Perhaps the most interesting and dramatic example 
of bargaining arose in the deal between Apple and Microsoft. The newly 
returned Steve Jobs took over Apple when it was in a dire financial 
position, and one avenue for a quick infusion of cash was to settle a 
patent dispute with Microsoft. Microsoft, in turn, was willing to settle 
the dispute quickly only as part of a comprehensive deal that included 
Apple making Internet Explorer the default browser for the Mac.
96 
Transcripts of Microsoft e-mail (made public later) showed that 
Gates and other Microsoft executives discussed how to hint to Jobs that 
it was possible for a delay in the release of Word for the Mac, a threat to 
gain movement from Jobs, since such a delay could hurt Apple’s 
s l u m p i n g  s a l e s .  I n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  e v e n  a  h i n t  o f  t h i s  d e l a y  t o  J o b s  w a s  
remarkable, since the development of Word was (actually) proceeding in 
a timely manner. After the fact, it is difficult to know what role such a 
threat played in addition to all the factors at work.
97 As it turned out, 
Jobs accepted the deal for Internet Explorer and his own customers 
booed him soundly at a convention when he initially announced it.
98 It 
surely was not the way for a newly returned CEO to curry favor with 
customers, but he was over a barrel at the time. 
Still, for sheer unpleasantness, the negotiation between Compaq 
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and Microsoft has no equivalent. Compaq had heard from many 
customers who wanted Netscape browsers, and featured it prominently. 
As a reward for listening, Microsoft publicly roughed up Compaq. In 
1996, for example, an employee at Compaq removed the Internet 
Explorer icon from shipped versions of computers. The employees 
viewed this as part of a range of actions to keep the icons less confusing, 
orienting them toward business obligations and toward the applications 
users wanted. Microsoft believed Compaq had a business obligation to 
display Internet Explorer, and it sent a letter to Compaq threatening to 
cut off its operating system license in sixty days if a removed Internet 
Explorer icon was not put back on all new systems
99 and the dispute did 
not come to resolution.
100 
Compaq capitulated on the dispute quickly. At the time it left 
everyone in the industry with the strong impression that Microsoft chose 
to make an example of Compaq, demonstrating the drawbacks to being a 
business partner that did not play by Microsoft’s rules. 
Why did it leave that impression? Because of the way negotiations 
took place. That dispute could have (and should have) been settled with a 
few phone calls to the right senior executives, or, at most, arbitration.
101 
That did not happen in part because Microsoft’s executives urgently 
wanted to keep their browser available in competition with Netscape, 
and they did not want to give the appearance of ceding even a temporary 
disadvantage. As was frequently pointed out in public forums, this was 
but one of several alleged strong-arm tactics that most computer 
company executives refused to discuss in public for fear of retaliation 
from Microsoft.
102 Similarly, no senior executive at Microsoft ever 
apologized, nor disavowed the action, nor did the firm ever give back any 
of the strategic gains it reaped from the action, which left the impression 
that the negotiating method was not an accident. 
As it happened here, in time the executive team at Microsoft 
concluded that it had not been sufficiently strict with its business 
  99. Letter from Don Hardwick, Group Manager, OEM Sales Div., Microsoft Corp., to 
Celeste Dunn, Vice President, Consumer Software Business Unit, Compaq (June 6, 1996), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/650.pdf. 
  100.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 59–60 (D.D.C. 1999). 
  101. Indeed, it was apparently settled through a few phone calls, but only after the 
threatening letter had been sent, which makes one wonder how much of the public discussion 
was simply making the best of it by putting lipstick on a pig. Thereafter, the Netscape and 
Internet Explorer icons appeared on both desktops for a short period, but Compaq 
renegotiated its contracts with others. See Declan McCullagh, Compaq: It Was All a Big Mix-
Up, WIRED, Feb. 16, 1999, http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/02/17938; see also 
Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 59–60. 
  102. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Jabs at Company Figure into Trial, WASH.  POST, Jan. 27, 
1999, at E01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/ 
microsoft/stories/1999/jabs012799.htm. 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  71 
partners, which motivated taking further action, accordingly to Judge 
Jackson’s recounting of events.
103 Thereafter, Microsoft inserted clauses 
into operating system licenses, which included restrictions on OEMs, 
including restrictions on the “out of the box” experience for users when 
they first fired-up their systems. Those same contractual restrictions later 
were used to prevent OEMs from adding help screens for users of the 
Netscape browser, among other issues that helped Microsoft’s 
competitive aims—albeit, by driving up OEM service expenses.
104 
Why are one-sided negotiations a bad sign for the innovative 
environment? They reveal one big problem: using their negotiating 
leverage, managers at the firm doing the dictating can find leeway to 
justify actions that make their own lives better or easier, even when it 
comes at the expense of others. That can become a detriment to 
innovation, especially when one-sided negotiations begin to serve 
defensive purposes of the dominant firm to the detriment of others. It 
can restrict the conduct of economic experiments and hinder the 
realization of competitive benefits from unfettered standards 
competition. 
In the above examples, Microsoft tried to reduce Netscape’s ability 
to distribute its products and made it difficult for users to find 
alternatives. It appears we can recognize unhealthy negotiations for 
innovative entrants when established firms prevent distributors from 
installing help screens for their users through contracting clauses, and 
when distributors complain about restrictions that limit users’ options to 
modify their products. 
To be sure, it is difficult to assess whether one-sided negotiation 
contributes to a negative outcome in general. While such open questions 
cannot be resolved entirely in a short essay such as this, consider three 
key questions as a start for diagnosing any specific example: (1) Does a 
firm dictating conditions possess market power and employ it in its 
bargaining behavior? (2) Are non-innovative tactics being employed to 
shape innovative behavior by others? (3) Are users being restricted for 
reasons that have any relationship to a product’s merits and 
functionality?
105 
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As illustration, consider the first screen restrictions (on help screens) 
that Microsoft employed on OEMs. The answer to the above questions 
would be yes, yes, and no, suggesting they are too one-sided and 
unhealthy. Not surprisingly, even while the appellate court reviewing 
Judge Jackson used dozens of pages to admonish his talking to reporters, 
its members could not bring themselves to alter his ruling about the use 
of first screen restrictions. That is, these were among the provisions the 
appellate court cited as violations of antitrust law.
106 
The epilogue to this episode is informative. As it turned out, the 
bright light of the court’s inquiry turned into a partial antiseptic—albeit 
it was a slow acting one from the viewpoint of those wanting strong 
action taken against Microsoft.
107 Publicity about these actions had an 
effect on developers, who have increasingly moved to open source 
platforms. In 2006, several years after the antitrust trial, Microsoft took 
public action to counter developer defections. 
Microsoft publicly declared that it had adopted a set of principles 
that bound the firm to remain consistent in its actions over time.
108 This 
action directly addressed one of the issues that perennially arose in the 
1990s—accusations that Microsoft’s employees altered APIs or other 
firm technologies in self-interested ways that discriminated between 
business partners.
109 This was thought to be a policy that application 
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developers would find encouraging, since it relieved concerns about the 
potential waste of time and effort out of negotiations. In 2008 Microsoft 
announced another set of principles for remaining consistent in its 
interoperability designs, and these reinforced the earlier points.
110 
Notice a key subtlety: Microsoft committed to consistency. 
Consistent policies from a firm are those that change slowly at most, 
allowing for the planning of others. They are changed without caprice, 
without an ad hoc approach, and without seemingly arbitrary timing, in 
other words, without actions that necessarily diminish the returns on 
others’ innovative, long-term investments. 
Consistency has great importance in interdependent value chains. 
Other firms will not make long-term investments if they fear not making 
a return on that investment due to changes by others, which are out of 
their control. Entrepreneurs will not take action if they fear conditions 
will change arbitrarily on them later, or systemically to their 
disadvantage. Firms will not undertake costly economic experiments if 
they cannot assure themselves that other firms won’t interfere with the 
conditions that support learning from their market experience. 
In adopting a commitment to consistency, Microsoft did not give 
up its rights to retain secrets (e.g., remain less than transparent) nor to 
give up its right to retain managerial discretion (e.g., exclude 
participation from outsiders) after engaging with business partners. 
Instead, Microsoft committed to not arbitrarily alter or apply what was 
decided unilaterally by management, inviting business partners (i.e., 
especially developers and OEMs) to inquire whether they receive 
treatment similar to another partner of Microsoft’s (i.e., another 
developer’s competitor).
111 
Will consistency lead to fewer take-it-or-leave-it offers? It depends 
on one’s view. Many books have been written about the managerial 
preference of Bill Gates, and many of Microsoft’s practices arose from his 
preferences.
112 His recent retirement suggests the firm would display less 
variance in its contracting activities in any event. In that case, the answer 
would seem to be yes. 
Once again, this viewpoint differs from the standard approach on 
by any other Microsoft product, such as the Microsoft Office system or Windows 
Live, will be disclosed for use by the developer community generally. That means 
that anything that Microsoft products can do in terms of how they plug into 
Windows, competing products will be able to do as well.  
Id. 
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Wall Street. That view typically stresses the profitability of being a 
leading firm and the benefits to employees working there—up to a point. 
For example, IBM in the 1970s had a great market position in large 
enterprise computing. Working there paid better than anything else in 
computing, albeit every veteran of that era talks about how internal 
politics consumed the organization. 
More recently, working at Microsoft’s Windows or Office division 
or Intel’s microprocessor division has had its benefits, since those 
divisions have been awash in billions. That enabled these companies to 
fund some rather ambitious internal projects, which was fun for many 
employees, although more fun for those managers who won the internal 
debates than those who lost. 
The focus on Microsoft’s profitability, or on IBM’s in the prior era, 
is simply too narrow a frame for thinking about the role of negotiations 
in shaping industry-wide innovative activity. The innovative health of 
many participants requires a broader vision and analysis, looking beyond 
the consequences of actions benefiting the largest incumbent firm. 
In conclusion, the absence of one-sided bargaining is a sign of 
health. Absence of one-sided negotiation indicates that no firm has 
largely shaped the actions of others. Such actions do not need to be 
unhealthy, and can arise for a variety of reasons. But it can be unhealthy 
when dominant firms face incentives to shape the behavior of innovative 
entrants and competitors in ways that benefit only the dominant firm. 
Such actions have the potential to limit innovative behavior. Particularly 
worrisome is a firm with market power imposing constraints which 
undermines economic experimentation, standards competition, and 
entrepreneurial entry. 
III. HEALTHY INNOVATIVE COMPETITION FROM DOMINANT 
FIRMS 
If this essay has any broad lessons, they are these two observations: 
First, it is myopic for policy to cede full discretion over innovation in an 
evolving value chain to any firm who happens to have market power 
today, whether it is Microsoft, Comcast, or whomever. Second, it also is 
myopic to cede full discretion over policy to slow moving regulation and 
court decisions, particularly when courts do not have reason to consider 
the range of policies to nurture long term investments by innovative 
actors in a complex and interrelated value chain. 
What is an alternative to such myopic policy? A third way, one that 
offers clear and predictable policy guidelines, coupled with administrative 
processes for quick resolution of disputes. This essay has stressed that 
such a regulatory policy would consist of more than just four sentences. It 
would stress four signs of innovative health as part of transparent and 2010]  INNOVATIVE HEALTH IN THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET  75 
consistent guidelines that private actors could use to anticipate policy. 
This section will illustrate the steps such reasoning might take, and 
how it could apply the four principles, but will not develop a full 
argument. That is, I briefly will consider behavioral analysis consistent 
with examining the health of an innovative market. For that purpose I 
will illustrate the issues raised during negotiations between Cogent and 
Sprint, and those raised by Comcast after it throttled Bit-Torrent traffic. 
First, consider Cogent’s negotiation breakdowns with other firms, 
particularly Sprint. The breakdowns generally were short, but had 
consequences for users nonetheless. 
Let’s start with the four principles. This breakdown deprived some 
users of full access to the Internet, violating any strict interpretation of 
the first of the FCC’s principals, i.e., access to the lawful Internet. A 
strict interpretation of the first of the four principles might require firms 
to interconnect under all circumstances, removing de-peering as a 
negotiating tactic. That policy would seem to be motivated by a desire to 
protect the user experience. 
That is problematic, in my view, because this behavioral rule got to 
the right answer for the wrong reasons, and, thus, sets a policy precedent 
with little value for others. As pointed out above, it misses several key 
insights about what those negotiations entailed, and what curtailing 
them would effect. 
Rather, these events raise issues in the competition policy for 
interconnection between an entrepreneurial firms and an established 
firm. In my view all parties behaved in ways that did not facilitate a path 
towards a Coasian solution. Non-participants in decision making were 
hurt by the actions of the parties involved. Government intervention was, 
thus, merited. 
The four principles fail to draw attention to many of the relevant 
competition policy issues in this case. For example, de-peering by an 
incumbent firm could be a tactic in discouraging a new entrant’s 
entrepreneurial behavior, or in discouraging an economic experiment. 
The key question is: Would the guidelines be implemented differently if 
they were preserving economic experiments or preventing incumbent 
firms from discouraging entrepreneurial entry? In my view this example 
illustrates that the answer is certainly yes. 
As a second example, consider Comcast’s unilateral declaration to 
throttle P2P applications on its lines with resets. The FCC eventually 
intervened, arguing that Comcast could not single out a specific 
application for such action. Comcast has responded with new proposals 
for ways to manage its traffic. 
As it played out, one striking feature about this event was the 
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permission. P2P users acted as if they could run any application, 
irrespective of its consequences for others, even when it degraded the 
quality of service for neighbors during peak-load time periods. Comcast 
acted as if it had full discretion to manage its data over its facilities 
without informing anyone, even its own customers. 
Using the analysis above, I would interpret this behavior as 
symptomatic of the lack of fully specified contracts (for the issues under 
dispute) between parties who (it would seem) actually have a contract. In 
other words, the development of P2P applications put both parties in a 
situation unanticipated by their original contract, which required a 
renegotiation of its terms. 
In my view all parties behaved in ways that did not facilitate 
building trust between them, and, thus, their behavior departed very far 
from anything that positively contributed to a path aimed towards a 
Coasian solution. Once again, government intervention was, thus, 
merited. 
To be sure, the basic economics of incomplete contracting partially 
favors giving discretion to Comcast’s management. Management could 
internalize the externality one user imposes on others—managing traffic 
for many users’ general benefit. That is, P2P applications, like Bit-
Torrent, can impose large negative externalities on other users, 
particularly in cable architectures during peak-load time periods. Such 
externalities can degrade the quality of service to the majority of users 
without some sort of limitation or restriction. 
That does not imply, however, that Comcast has unfettered 
discretion to manage the situation. There is at least one additional 
incomplete contract to consider, that between Comcast and other 
providers of applications presently in the market. Arguably, there is a 
public policy issue regarding those innovative entrepreneurs who are not 
in the market at present, but might be in the near term. It would be quite 
difficult for Comcast and future entrants to reach a Coasian bargain—
some of them do not even exist yet! In brief, Comcast’s actions also have 
consequences for long-run innovative incentives by other application 
providers. 
In that sense, Comcast’s behavior had many less appealing aspects, 
such as its lack of transparency, and the lack of participation from others 
in decision making, as well as its virtually one-sided negotiating stance 
with all other application providers and lack of clear statements about its 
own actions,
113 until the FCC intervened.
114 Moreover, the firm’s initially 
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inflexible public stance appeared to be aimed at shaping the willingness 
of others to experiment. Arguably, if it persisted, it would also shape 
proposals for new applications using new standards, and entrepreneurial 
initiatives whose businesses depended on Comcast’s actions. It is not 
obviously healthy for innovation to give Comcast’s management 
unchecked discretion to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to providers of 
any application its management believes harms users. 
Here, once again, the FCC’s principles fall short of being 
guidelines. They do not direct attention towards the salient issues in 
several new areas of application development or an analysis that takes 
into account the signs of innovative health. An entrepreneur’s returns on 
investments will depend on their ability to transmit data over Comcast’s 
lines. The key question is: does the lack of rules for Comcast’s behavior 
encourage or discourage entrepreneurship in new applications? In my 
view this example illustrates that the absence of a clear limitation to 
Comcast’s discretion reduces investment incentives for any entrepreneur 
who anticipates putting their application over Comcast’s lines. 
Both these examples illustrate one additional aspect in which the 
FCC principles fall short of being guidelines. Both cases raise general 
issues that are likely to arise again, perhaps with different participants, 
perhaps in different locations. In neither case do the FCC principles 
translate into clear, positive behavioral guidelines for the firms under 
scrutiny. While there are implications for what not to do, there is scant, 
positive guidance for what to do. 
Imagine the discussion taking place within the management at 
Comcast and Cogent, or any other firm who wants to learn lessons from 
watching the actions of these firms. When making their tactical 
strategies, they surely must be asking: What sort of behavior will 
generate a positive/negative policy response? By what norms for 
consistent, transparent, and participatory decision making, if any, will 
this firm’s actions be judged? They had little information from which to 
forecast policy. 
Consistency and transparency are virtues for policy making. If only 
the FCC elaborated on their meaning in publically available guidelines, 
these firms could anticipate what potential issues their own actions might 
trigger. That is the benefit of guidelines that go beyond four sentences. 
Guidelines remove impediments to anticipating the reaction of policy 
makers to a firm’s actions. That might not improve the quality of 
decision makers, but almost certainly it will reduce the likelihood of 
running afoul of well reasoned guidelines, clearly articulated in advance. 
That has to improve the quality of managerial action. 
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